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PURPOSE
The purpose of this paper is to analyze decisions by the fed-
eral court system in general, and the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit in particular, from an unusual perspective-
their impact on domestic relations law.' Despite the Eighth
Circuit's view to the contrary, the authors believe it is playing
an increasingly influential role in family law matters.
t Professor of Law at William Mitchell College of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota.
tt B. Sc. and L.L.B., London University, England;J.D., summa cum laude, Wil-
liam Mitchell College of Law; associate in the Minneapolis law firm of Maslon
EdelmanBorman & Brand. The authors express their special appreciation to the
word processing unit at Maslon Edelman Borman & Brand and in particular Maureen
Gagliardi, Karen Galarowicz and Marthanne Theel.
1. The states within the Eighth Circuit are Minnesota, North and South Dakota,
Iowa, Nebraska, Missouri and Arkansas.
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I. RESTRICTIVE JURISDICTIONAL POLICY
If one asked an Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals judge if he2
thought the court's decisions had a significant impact on do-
mestic relations matters, the initial response would probably
be no. One reason for the response lies with the traditional
view of two well-recognized, judicially created, exceptions to
the exercise of federal jurisdiction: the probate exception and
the domestic relations exception.3 These exceptions have
been influential in how the Eighth Circuit has viewed its role in
domestic matters, that is, one of very limited involvement! 4
The traditional doctrine, which until recently has seen little
scholarly criticism, 5 is not premised on explicit statutory lan-
guage that limits the jurisdictional authority of federal courts.
Indeed, the jurisdictional statute used by many plaintiffs to
bring suits grants original jurisdiction to federal district courts
"in all civil actions" that meet the jurisdictional amount and
diversity of citizenship requirement. 6 Rather, the traditional
view is based upon dicta by the dissent in Barber v. Barber 7 and
2. There are currently no female judges on the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals.
3. Overman v. United States, 563 F.2d 1287, 1292 (8th Cir. 1977). The court
declared: "Federal courts should be extremely wary of becoming general arbiters of
any domestic relations imbroglio." Id.
4. Id. Again, the court maintained: "There is, and ought to be, a continuing
federal policy to avoid handling domestic relations cases in federal court in the ab-
sence of important concerns of a constitutional dimension." Id.
5. Poker, A Proposal for the Abolition of the Domestic Relations Exception, 71 MARQ. L.
REv. 141 (1987) (domestic relations and probate, the two judicially created excep-
tions to federal jurisdiction, have not been subjected to much scholarly criticism). See
Atwood, Domestic Relations Cases in Federal Court: Toward a Principled Exercise of Jurisdic-
tion, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 571, 574 (1984) (no valid jurisdictional theory justifying auto-
matic invocation of the domestic relations exception in every case of intrafamilial
dispute); Comment, Enforcing State Domestic Relations Decrees in Federal Courts, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1357, 1358-59 (1983) (Domestic relations exception began with a group
of nineteenth-century cases concerned with jurisdiction over the enforcement of cus-
tody and alimony decrees. In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890) is the case most fre-
quently cited for the proposition that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over
domestic relations.); Comment, Federal Jurisdiction and the Domestic Relations Exception: A
Search for Parameters, 31 UCLA L. REV. 843, 844-45 (1984) (domestic relations excep-
tion arose in Supreme Court dictum in 1858, and federal courts have observed a
hands-off policy since then); Note, The Domestic Relations Exception to Diversity Jurisdic-
tion, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1824 (1983) (federal courts refuse to exercise diversity juris-
diction over* cases deemed to involve domestic relations disputes); Rush, Domestic
Relations Law: Federal Jurisdiction and State Sovereignty in Perspective, 60 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1, 30 (1984) (federal courts should follow narrowly defined domestic relations
exception).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
7. Barber v. Barber 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858). Justice Daniel, dissented:
[Vol. 16
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by the majority in In re Burrus.8
Barber is the cornerstone of the traditional view. For the first
time, the Supreme Court entertained an action filed in federal
court in Wisconsin by a wife residing in New York. She sought
to enforce a New York state court decree, which granted her
separation and alimony. Over objection, the federal district
court ruled that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the con-
troversy. On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the district
court's decision. The majority commented:
Our first remark is-and we wish it to be remembered-
that this is not a suit asking the court for the allowance of
alimony. That has been done by a court of competent juris-
diction. The court in Wisconsin was asked to interfere to
prevent that decree from being defeated by fraud.
We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of
the United States upon the subject of divorce, or for the
allowance of alimony, either as an original proceeding in
chancery or as an incident to divorce a vinculo, or to one
from bed and board.9
Justice Daniel, writing for the dissent, stated that federal
courts had absolutely no jurisdiction over the subjects of di-
vorce and alimony. He supported this view by analogy to the
English Chancery Courts, noting that the English Ecclesiastical
Courts had exclusive jurisdiction over marriage and divorce.
Because chancery jurisdiction was never extended to actions of
divorce or alimony, and the federal courts were courts of chan-
cery, along the lines of their English counterparts, he reasoned
they did not possess jurisdiction over such matters.' 0
In Burrus, the federal jurisdictional exception was enlarged
to include child custody matters. In this case, a father and a
grandfather were embroiled in litigation over the custody of a
child and a habeas corpus statute provided the procedural ba-
sis for deciding the issue. The Supreme Court held that the
federal court lacked jurisdiction declaring the father was im-
"It is not in accordance with the design and operation of a Government having its
origin in causes and necessities, political, general, and external, that it should assume
to regulate the domestic relations of society .... " Id. at 602.
8. In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890). Justice Miller, in dicta, said: "The whole
subject of the domestic relations of the husband and wife, parent and child, belongs
to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States." Id. at 593-94.
9. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 584.
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properly imprisoned for disobeying a child custody order is-
sued in the habeas corpus proceeding." In dictum the Court
observed that "[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of
husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the
States and not to the laws of the United States."' 2 The Court
subsequently reaffirmed its hands-off policy in domestic mat-
ters in Simms v. Simms. 
3
By 1906, the dicta from Barber and Burrus, and the affirma-
tion in Simms, had firmly established a restricted domestic rela-
tions jurisdictional doctrine within the federal system. For
example, in De La Rama v. De La Rama, 14 the Court observed:
It has been a long established rule that the courts of the
United States have no jurisdiction upon the subject of di-
vorce, or for the allowance of alimony, either as an original
proceeding in chancery, or an incident of a divorce or sepa-
ration, both by reason of fact that the husband and wife can-
not usually be citizens of different States, so long as the
married relation continues (a rule which has been somewhat
relaxed in recent cases), and for the further reason that a
suit for divorce in itself involves no pecuniary value.' 5
Finally, in Ohio ex rel Popovici v. Agler, 16 the Court held that
the constitution and statutes must be interpreted in light of the
common understanding that "jurisdiction of the Courts of the
United States over divorces and alimony always has been de-
nied."' 7 Despite its inaccuracy and subsequent calls by a few
federal courts for abandonment,' 8 the traditional view has pre-
vailed. More recently, however, courts have shifted to a some-
what different rationale to limit federal court involvement in
domestic matters.
The contemporary rationale for the exception is premised
on policy considerations. Federal courts reason that: (1) states
have a strong interest in domestic relations matters and have
11. Burrus, 136 U.S. at 596. Diversity jurisdiction was not an issue.
12. Id. at 593-94.
13. 175 U.S. 162, 168 (1899) (ruling, however, it had jurisdiction to review a
divorce and alimony decree granted by Arizona's territorial court).
14. De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303 (1906).
15. Id. at 307.
16. 280 U.S. 379 (1930).
17. Id. at 383.
18. See, e.g., Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842, 843 (1st Cir. 1981) (historical inaccura-
cies of the exception recognized but had endured too long to be now abandoned);
Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 800 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (in spite of the exception,
the court has heard appeals in divorce actions).
(Vol. 16
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developed an expertise in settling family disputes; (2) such dis-
putes often require ongoing supervision, a task for which fed-
eral courts are not suited; (3) federal adjudication of such
disputes increases the chances of incompatible or duplicative
federal and state court decrees; and (4) domestic relations
cases have no federal interest, while crowding the federal court
calendar.1 9 Regardless of whether the traditional or contem-
porary view is used, the result is the same-the dispute is
rejected.
Federal courts look beyond the label attached to a dispute in
deciding whether or not to hear a matter and typically focus
their inquiry on the type of determination necessary to resolve
the underlying claim. Thus, a domestic claim submitted to fed-
eral court in the guise of contract or tort does not automati-
cally fall outside the domestic relations exception.
20
Consequently, the vast majority of domestic disputes con-
tinue as the exclusive province of state courts. 21 Only occa-
sionally do federal courts touch on traditional domestic
relations issues.22 Exceptions include, for example, a dispute
over payment of attorney fees arising out of dissolution litiga-
tion. 23 Or, an agreement for alimony or support, which may
19. Rykers v. Alford, 832 F.2d 895, 899-900 (5th Cir. 1987); Ruffalo v. Civiletti,
702 F.2d 710, 717 (8th Cir. 1983).
20. Compare Rykers, 832 F.2d at 899-900 (Domestic relations exception bars hus-
band's tort claims against his common law wife. The claims arose out of his arrest for
allegedly kidnapping the couple's child and would require a determination of the
husband and wife's respective rights to custody of the child.) and Bennett v. Bennett,
682 F.2d 1039, 1042-44 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (tort action brought by father against for-
mer wife for allegedly kidnapping their children falls within the domestic relations
exception which precludes granting injunction setting future custody and visitation
rights) with McIntyre v. McIntyre, 771 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1985) (Domestic
relations exception does not apply to claim alleging past breach of visitation rights
granted by state court because claim did not require determination of spousal or
parental status) and Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d at 1083, 1087-89 (4th Cir. 1980) (Domes-
tic relations exception does not bar husband's tort claims against former wife for
arson, conversion, and malicious prosecution because determination of case does not
require the court to adjust family status or establish duties.).
21. See Baron, The Evolution of Domestic Relations Cases in Our Federal Courts, 1985 S.
ILL. U.L.J. 353; Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
489 (1954).
22. Zimmermann v. Zimmermann, 395 F. Supp. 719, 721 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (juris-
diction taken of suit by wife against husband for breach of an agreement for support
where parties had been separated for nine years and no pending state court
proceeding).
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be enforced on the theory the obligation is a contract. 24 Fur-
thermore, tort claims involving intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, 25 child enticement, 26 and tortious interference
with the custody of a child are occasionally heard by federal
courts.
27
While some lower federal courts have heard declaratory ac-
tions involving the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 es-
pecially where state courts have made conflicting decisions
regarding custody of a minor child, 29 the Supreme Court re-
cently discouraged such activity. In an opinion without dis-
sent, it held that federal courts should not play an enforcement
role when two states disagree over which parent is entitled to
custody of a child.30
Federal courts continue to decline to exercise diversity juris-
diction in divorce or annulment matters, support payment dis-
putes and child custody matters. 3' The reluctance to become
involved where diversity jurisdiction is claimed has influenced
the applicability of the domestic relations exception in the con-
24. See, e.g., Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1978).
25. See, e.g., Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1014 (1982).
26. See id.
27. See Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1988).
29. See, e.g., Hickey v. Baxter, 800 F.2d 430 (4th Cir. 1986) (federal jurisdiction
exercised to enforce one of two conflicting state custody orders); McDougald v. Jen-
son, 786 F.2d 1465 (11 th Cir. 1986) (federal court can exercise jurisdiction over cus-
tody matter to resolve conflicting. provisions of state court decrees); Heartfield v.
Heartfield, 749 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1985) (federal district courts have jurisdiction to
enforce compliance with Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act); DiRuggiero v. Rod-
gers, 743 F.2d 1009 (3d Cir. 1984) (federal district court can exercise federal ques-
tion jurisdiction in Parental Kidnapping Protection Act claims); Flood v. Braaten, 727
F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1984) (federal district court has jurisdiction when state court im-
properly asserts jurisdiction under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act).
30. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988) (holding that the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 does not provide an implied cause of action in
federal court to determine which of two conflicting state custody decisions is valid).
31. See, e.g., Gonzalez Canevero v. Rexach, 793 F.2d 417 (1st Cir. 1986) (federal
district court does not have jurisdiction over matrimonial property dispute action);
Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (federal district court cannot
grant injunctive relief in spousal kidnapping case); Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134 (9th
Cir. 1982) (federal district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear marital sta-
tus action); Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1981) (child custody claim not
within jurisdiction of federal district court); Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083 (4th Cir.
1980) (federal district courts have no jurisdiction to grant divorces, award alimony,
or determine child custody); Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1975) (no
federal jurisdiction in child custody case).
(Vol. 16
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text of other sources of federal jurisdiction.3 2 Nevertheless, it
remains unclear how great that influence is on disputes
brought under the federal question statutes.
33
Historically, the Eighth Circuit has attempted to adhere to
the restrictive domestic relations view espoused by the
Supreme Court and the other Federal Circuit Courts of Ap-
peal. However, in a subtle, but nevertheless remarkable and
increasingly important manner, several of its decisions are hav-
ing a major impact on domestic relations matters within the
circuit's jurisdiction.
II. BANKRUPTCY AND PENSIONS
The Eighth Circuit's recent three-judge panel decision in
Bush v. Taylor,34 which permits future pension awards to be dis-
charged in bankruptcy proceedings, was heard en banc April
10, 1990.35 If the decision is affirmed en banc, it will have a
wide-spread, dramatic impact on divorced traditional home-
makers who were awarded pension benefits but did not exe-
cute a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QUADRO).
Unfortunately, because QUADROs were not available until
1984, a large number of traditional homemakers involved in
divorces before that year 3 6-and those whose lawyers failed to
execute QUADROs after 1984-may be directly affected.3
7
32. See Ingram v. Hayes, 866 F.2d 368, 370-72 (11 th Cir. 1988) (discussing the
varying approaches taken by other circuits to determine whether the domestic rela-
tions exception applies to cases brought under the federal question statute).
33. See, e.g., Overman v. United States, 563 F.2d 1287 (8th Cir. 1977); Car-
queville v. Woodruff, 153 F.2d 1011 (6th Cir. 1946).
34. Bush v. Taylor, 893 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1990).
35. While completing this section of the article, the authors learned that the
court of appeals reheard the case en banc on April 10, 1990. This article will be
published before the en banc decision is handed down. The authors believe that the
decision will be reversed by the full panel of the Eighth Circuit.
36. In 1981, the number of annual divorces climbed to a record 1.21 million.
During the ten year period 1975-1985, there were annually one million or more di-
vorces in the United States. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STA-
TISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 85 (109 ed. 1989). It is estimated that
more than half the civil cases pending before the courts in this nation involve family
disputes. It is also estimated that 49 percent of all existing marriages will end in
divorce. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, OFFICE OF CHILD
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ESSENTIALS FOR
ATTORNEYS IN CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, xix (1985).
37. The Retirement Equity Act of 1984 amended ERISA and the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1954 to create a limited exception to the prohibition of assignment or
alienation of qualified plan benefits if a Qualified Domestic Relations Order
1990]
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Moreover, most divorcing couples have only a few assets, other
than their homestead and pension, to distribute. Therefore,
removing a future right to receive pension benefits may leave a
traditional homemaker unexpectedly penniless. Finally, Bush
has created a new headache for state courts charged with dis-
tributing property fairly in dissolution proceedings: it has in-
jected an additional element of uncertainty into the decision-
making process; it has placed state courts in the awkward posi-
tion of having to decide whether it is legally possible to reopen
old property settlements; and it will generate large scale efforts
to modify existing maintenance awards.
38
In a nutshell, the Eighth Circuit declared in Bush that be-
cause property obligations created by state divorce decrees are
debts, 39 and because pensions are considered property, 40 a
spouse may discharge a pension obligation under the Bank-
ruptcy Code4 ' via a bankruptcy action. For reasons set forth
below, we believe the decision is incorrect.
(QUADRO) is issued pursuant to state law. QUADROs are exempt from the pre-
emptive and spendthrift provisions of ERISA. Special rules provide for the distribu-
tion of pension benefits pursuant to divorce actions. The Tax Reform Act of 1986
rewrote many of the rules regarding QUADROs. See Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat.
2953 (1986).
The Retirement Equity Act brought consistency to the pension area. First, it
provided a limited exception to the ERISA prohibition against assignment or aliena-
tion of qualified plan benefits as long as a state court order met the requirements of
the newly defined QUADRO. Second, new rules were written to facilitate distribu-
tion of plan benefits to the divorced spouse. Finally, plan administrators were insu-
lated against breach of fiduciary responsibility as long as they complied with a court
order which met the requirements of the newly defined Qualified Domestic Relations
Act.
38. See Note, Pension Awards in Divorce and Bankruptcy, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 194
(1988); Freeburger & Bowles, What Divorce Court Giveth, Bankruptcy Court Taketh Away:
A Review of the Dischargeability of Marital Support Obligations, 24 J. FAM. L. 587
(1985-1986); Ravin & Rosen, The Dischargeability in Bankruptcy of Alimony, Maintenance
and Support Obligations, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1986).
39. See generally K. REDDEN, FEDERAL REGULATION OF FAMILY LAW § 9.2(A)(1)
(1982).
40. SeeJanssen v. Janssen, 331 N.W.2d 752 (Minn. 1983); Laster v. Laster, 197
Mont. 470, 643 P.2d 597 (1982).
41. Bush v. Taylor, 893 F.2d at 965 (discussion of the application of II U.S.C.
§ 101(4)(11) (1988)). Vested and immature unvested pensions are considered mari-
tal assets. A pension is vested if the right to the pension is guaranteed, even though
employment ends. A vested, immature pension is one where there are remaining
conditions, such as retirement, that must occur before an employee can receive pen-
sion payments. See Blumberg, Marital Property Treatment of Pensions, Disability Pay,
Workers' Compensation, and Other Wage Substitutes: An Insurance, or Replacement, Analysis, 33
UCLA L. REV. 1250 (1986).
[Vol. 16
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Historically, both the Supreme Court and Congress have
protected the rights of a dependent spouse, and the children
involved in a divorce, from the impact of bankruptcy. For ex-
ample, while the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to pro-
mote a debtor's fresh start by discharging past debts, the code
does not permit a former spouse to discharge child support,
alimony, and attorney fees awarded in divorce decrees, 42 re-
gardless of the hardship on the bankrupt individual.43 This
ninety-two year view can be traced back to the original 1898
Act. While marital support is not exempt from discharge in
bankruptcy,44 the Supreme Court, when confronted with the
question, has declared that there existed a "natural and legal
duty of the husband to support the wife." 45 The Court held
that a dependent spouse had a right to a portion of the wage
earning spouse's assets, regardless of the subsequent bank-
ruptcy.46 Thus the Court has judicially created a marital obli-
gation exception. In 1903, Congress codified the marital
exception, which remained essentially unchanged 47 until
42. See, e.g., Foster v. Childers, 416 N.W.2d 781 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding
attorney fees are not dischargeable in bankruptcy proceedings). Id. at 785.
43. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(B) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) provides that:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b) or 1328(b) of this
title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt ....
(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, main-
tenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a
separation agreement, divorce decree, or other order of a court of rec-
ord.., or property settlement agreement, but not to the extent that...
(B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or
support, unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, mainte-
nance, or support.
Id.
44. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 17, 30 Stat. 544, 550-51 (1898).
45. Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575, 577 (1901). The Supreme Court rea-
soned that because alimony was not a provable debt, it could not be discharged
under the Bankruptcy Act. The debt did not arise under a business transaction or
contract but involved a husband's duty to support his wife. See also Wetmore v.
Markoe, 196 U.S. 68 (1904). The Court said, "[Alimony is] a legal means of enforc-
ing the obligation of the husband and father to support and maintain his wife and
children." Id. at 74; Note, Dissolution of Mariage and the Bankruptcy Act of 1973: "Fresh
Start" Forgotten, 52 IND. L.J. 469, 473 (1977). Judicial views of the marital discharge
exception indicate that "the non-bankrupt spouse's need for continued maintenance
and support outweighs the bankrupt's need for a fresh start." Id.
46. Audubon, 181 U.S. at 580.
47. Act of February 5, 1903, ch. 487, § 5, 32 Stat. 797, 798 (1903) (repealed
1979). Congress has made it clear that only federal law can distinguish between what
is property and what is support. The Eighth Circuit granted rehearing of Bush on
February 27, 1990. Oral arguments were heard on April 10, 1990. The en banc
1990]
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1978,48 when Congress reaffirmed the rule that support
awarded in a divorce is not dischargeable in a bankruptcy
proceeding. 49
The issue before the Eighth Circuit in Bush, 50 was whether
Taylor, a debtor under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, was
entitled to a discharge of his ongoing obligation under a state
court divorce decree which required him to remit to his former
wife one-half of the payments he received under a pension
plan. The Bankruptcy Court denied the discharge on two
grounds. First, it ruled that the prospective obligation to turn
over a percentage of the pension payments was not a "debt"
subject to discharge. Second, it ruled that Taylor held his ex-
wife's portion of the pensibn only as a constructive trustee.
While the district court affirmed the bankruptcy judge's ruling,
the Eighth Circuit in a 2-1 decision reversed, holding that the
obligation to remit a portion of pension payments falls within
the broad and flexible definition of debt under the Code.5'
The majority reasoned that the obligation arises from a prop-
erty settlement, a species of debt that Congress chose not to
exempt from discharge. The facts underlying the decision re-
flect its harsh impact.
When Taylor and Bush divorced in 1975, the divorce decree
awarded Bush one-half of Taylor's benefits under an employ-
ment pension plan. However, upon retirement, Taylor refused
to send Bush her half of the benefits. By 1982, several thou-
sand dollars in pension arrears had accumulated, and Bush re-
turned to divorce court seeking redress. Although it is not
entirely clear, the couple appeared to reach a repayment
agreement which contained a covenant not to execute on the
judgment. Under the agreement, Taylor promised to pay
Bush one-half of the $16,412.52 in benefits he retained
through June 30, 1982, and the remainder in monthly incre-
ments of $500.00. He also agreed to pay, as originally or-
dered, one-half of his pension, plus one-half of all subsequent
decision will be the last word on what is property and what is support in the Eighth
Circuit's jurisdiction, absent review by the Supreme Court.
48. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2590 (codified
as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988)).
49. Id. Congress rejected the original Bankruptcy Commission's proposal that
would have eliminated the property-support distinction.
50. 893 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1990).
51. Id. at 965-66.
[Vol. 16
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increases in the amount of monthly pension benefits he re-
ceived for the rest of his life. Bush agreed to withhold execu-
tion of the judgment on the arrears if Taylor paid her
$8,500.00 immediately, made $500.00 monthly payments on
the remainder, and remitted one-half of all future pension ben-
efits. If Taylor was more than twenty days late in making any
of his payments under the agreement, the covenant automati-
cally terminated, allowing Bush to employ any legal means
necessary to collect the full amount of the agreed upon judg-
ment and order.52
In 1987, Taylor and his new wife filed a Chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy petition and listed among their debts Taylor's ex-wife's
future claim to one-half of his pension benefits. His ex-wife
objected to the discharge and the Bankruptcy Court agreed,
ruling she was entitled to one-half of all future pension bene-
fits as her separate property. Taylor appealed to the district
court. The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Arkansas affirmed the bankruptcy ruling, relying in part on
In re Teichman.53 In Teichman, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that because future pension payments had not yet
become due and payable at the time of a bankruptcy petition,
they did not represent dischargeable debts under the Code. 54
Alternatively, the district court held that Taylor had been
placed in a fiduciary position by the divorce court and merely
held the pension payments for Bush's benefit, as a constructive
trustee for future payment. Finally, the district court declared
that, without regard to the Taylors' needs, it would be inequi-
table for Bush to be deprived of her "sole and separate prop-
erty" in the bankruptcy proceedings. 55
The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals firmly rejected the rea-
soning and analysis of the bankruptcy judge and the district
court. 56 It held that Taylor's ongoing obligation to provide his
52. Id. at 964.
53. 774 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1985).
54. Id. at 1397-98. See also 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1988) (discharge covers debts
arising before order for relief).
55. Bush, 893 F.2d at 964.
56. Bush, 893 F.2d at 967. See also In re Chandler, 805 F.2d 555, 557 (5th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1049 (1987) (ex-husband could not discharge the portion
of army benefits awarded to wife since the benefits had become her sole property);
Teichman, 774 F.2d 1395, 1397-98 (9th Cir. 1985) (ex-husband not obligated to pay
former wife until Air Force paid him; therefore, debt did not arise until the payment
was due); In re Hall, 51 Bankr. 1002, 1003 (S.D. Ga. 1985) (although former wife held
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ex-wife with one-half of his pension was nothing more than a
debt for property settlement, the payment of which is not yet
due. It supported its ruling by defining the meaning of "debt"
provided by the Bankruptcy Code as simply "liability on a
claim." 57 A "claim" was in turn defined as a right to payment,
whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated,
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, dis-
puted, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured, or a
right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such
breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such
right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, se-
cured, or unsecured. 58 The majority reasoned that "Congress
chose this broad definition of 'claim' so that 'all legal obliga-
tions of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, [may
be] dealt with in the bankruptcy case,' thus allowing the
'broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy court.' 59 There-
fore, Bush could not argue that she had a "claim" against Tay-
lor for a share of the pension payments in the months and
years to come regardless of its contingent or unmatured na-
ture. The court observed that:
Because Bush has a claim for which Taylor is liable, there
is a debt that came into existence when the state court made
Taylor liable on the claim. Although a debt for alimony,
maintenance, or support is not subject to discharge, 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(5), Bush stipulated below that the obliga-
tion was for a property settlement. The debt is therefore
dischargeable.
60
Consequently, whenever a debt arising from a division of
"claim" for pension benefits, liability for claim rested on Army, which made direct
payments, not on exrhusband); In re McNierney, 97 B.R. 648, 651 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1989) (future payments of retirement benefits to ex-wife not dischargeable); In re
Mace, 82 B.R. 864, 868 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987) (ex-husband was merely a "conduit"
for payments due to former wife from share of pension fund that belonged to her); In
re Manners, 62 B.R. 656, 658 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1986) (United States, not debtor, is
liable for pension benefits); In re Thomas, 47 B.R. 27, 33 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1984)
(court had no power to modify ex-wife's interest in her separate property).
57. Bush, 893 F.2d at 965. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) (1988).
58. Bush, 893 F.2d at 965 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (A) (B) (1988)).
59. Bush, 893 F.2d at 965 (citing S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5807-08; H.R. Rep. No.
595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 309, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5963, 6266).
60. Bush, 893 F.2d at 965.
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marital property is discharged, the nondebtor spouse is
thereby deprived of his or her separate interest in property.
Therefore, reasoned the majority, despite the divorce decree's
ruling giving her a "sole and separate" property interest in the
pension, the debt was dischargeable. 6'
The dissenting judge was not persuaded by the majority's
reasoning:
The Court's decision is indefensible. It permits a dead-
beat husband to use the Bankruptcy Code's grace for hon-
est debtors as a slick scheme for euchring his former wife
out of her "sole and separate property" in one-half of the
benefits he receives under a pension plan. Under the
Court's decision, the former wife's entitlement to one-half
of the pension benefits-a property right established by ju-
dicial decree when the marriage was dissolved-becomes
merely another debt dischargeable in bankruptcy. The re-
sult is that, post-bankruptcy, the husband will enjoy 100
percent of the monthly pension benefits for as long as he
lives, and his ex-wife will be deprived forever of her half of
these benefits. Short of outright thievery, it is hard to imag-
ine a more compelling case of unjust enrichment.
If I truly thought that Congress had commanded such a
bizarre and unjust result, I would join the Court's
opinion. 62
While we agree with the dissenter's emotional perspective,
we also believe there are additional reasons for not allowing
the discharge. We suggest that the majority should have fo-
cused more on the conceptualization of "debt" and "due and
owing," as those terms are used in the Bankruptcy Code. To
illustrate, assume that a wife is awarded a future one-half inter-
est in her husband's pension upon retirement, and her hus-
band seeks to have the obligation discharged via a bankruptcy
proceeding. Conceptually, he is not seeking discharge of a
"debt" because the liability has not yet arisen. And logically,
because no liability exists, it cannot be discharged.
To illustrate further, assume that a husband in a divorce pro-
ceeding' is ordered to pay his ex-wife $10,000 as a lump sum
cash settlement and following the divorce, he seeks to have the
award discharged. Because the lump sum is "due and owing"
as a "debt," we believe, under the current state of law, it can
61. Id. at 965-66.
62. Id. at 967 (Bowman, J., dissenting).
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be discharged. Similarly, if an ex-wife is awarded a portion of
the present value of a pension, it is likewise dischargeable in a
bankruptcy proceeding because it is a "debt," which is "due
and owing" at the time the bankruptcy action occurs. How-
ever, a discharge of future pension obligations conceptually
fails the debt "due and owing" analysis.
Another reason for distinguishing future pension benefits
from debts "due and owing" lies in the assumption underlying
bankruptcy actions and the unjust enrichment of the husband.
To illustrate, a husband who asks a bankruptcy court to dis-
charge a debt does so on the assumption he does not have suf-
ficient funds with which to pay it. Conceptually, that is not the
situation when he seeks discharge of a future liability to pay
over portions of a pension award. In that instance, the hus-
band is asking that funds payable in the future to his ex-wife
simply be diverted to him.
Finally, it is difficult to believe that Congress ever intended
the Bankruptcy Code to achieve such an unjust result. In par-
ticular, the opinion may cause further injury to that large
group of divorced women, who are nearing or have reached
retirement age and for whom no QUADRO has been executed.
Moreover, the ruling may add to the economic injury already
suffered by many within this group who never received ade-
quate child support.
Many traditional homemakers entered into long-term mari-
tal relationships with conventional values. They performed
traditional homemaker duties, only to suffer economic disaster
when divorced. 63 Upon divorce they found they were unable
to maintain or achieve the standard of living enjoyet during
the marriage relationship. They were unable to obtain em-
ployment which provided income approaching that of their
male partner. Moreover, they discovered they faced a difficult,
uncertain battle in attempting to obtain permanent mainte-
nance. Because of the Bush decision, the portion of a couple's
pension earned by the traditional homemaker through her work
as cook, housekeeper, nurse, nanny, and lover is being taken
from her, leaving little or nothing on which to live in her de-
63. McLindon, Separate But Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Divorce for Women and
Children, 21 FAM. L. Q. 351 (1987).
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The harsh impact of the Eighth Circuit's opinion will be felt
the most by the divorced traditional homemaker, who during
her mid-forties receives custody of the couple's children. Be-
tween 1963 and 1975, the national divorce rate increased 100
percent and increased 100 percent again in each year thereaf-
ter until 1981. In 1981, the number of divorces in the United
States 'eached a record 1.21 million. It is further estimated
that forty-nine percent of all existing marriages will end in di-
vorce.65 Of the women who were to receive child support in
1985, sixty-three percent had court-ordered payments, while
thirty-three percent had a voluntary agreement. 66 Women
with court-ordered payments received only fifty-six percent of
the amount due.6
7
In 1986, of the 8.8 million women raising children whose
fathers were not living in the household, sixty-one percent or
about 5.4 million were awarded child support by the courts. 68
Of the women who had support awards due about one half re-
ceived full payment from the father.69 Other data indicate that
the poverty rate for female-headed, single-parent families is
three times the national average for all families. 70 It is clear
that millions of American children with divorced parents are
living in poverty. 7' The Bush decision only adds to the serious
64. Ironically, in the case of Ms. Bush, Taylor's new wife stands to gain from the
bankruptcy.
65. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, OFFICE OF CHILD
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, ESSENTIALS FOR
ATTORNEYS IN CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, xix (1985).
66. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, P-23, No. 152, CHILD SUP-
PORT AND ALIMONY: 1985, 6 (1981).
67. Id. at 6. As of spring 1986, of women with children whose father was absent
from the home, about thirty-two percent (2.8 million) had incomes below the poverty
level. Id. at 4.
68. BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, P-23, No. 152, CHILD SUPPORT
AND ALIMONY: 1985, I (1987), reviewed by 13 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1568 (Sept. 22,
1987); see also NATIONAL CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT REFERENCE CENTER, OFFICE
OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Secre-
tary Heckler Announces Child Support Initiative, Child Support Rep. (special issue) Aug.
1984, at 2.
69. BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, P-23, No. 152, CHILD SUPPORT
AND ALIMONY: 1985 1 (1987), reviewed by 13 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1568 (Sept. 22,
1987).
70. Roberts, Ameliorating the Feminization of Poverty: Whose Responsibility?, 18
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 883, 884 (1984).
71. NATIONAL CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT REFERENCE CENTER, OFFICE OF
CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Nonsup-
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problems already experienced by such women who were also
awarded a future interest in their former husband's pension.
It is difficult to accept the majority view that Congress was
not aware of the plight of the divorced homemaker and the
implications of allowing her husband to bar her from sharing
in his pension. Fortunately, in the case of most divorces since
1984-85, we believe that the execution of a Qualified Domestic
Relations Order completely divests a husband of any right in
the future payments, and a wife is protected from the conse-
quences of the Bush decision. 72 However, for the large group
of divorced traditional homemakers without QUADROs, the
decision is a disaster! This decision should be reversed by the
Eighth Circuit.
III. FAMILY WIRETAPPING
Despite recent reforms aimed at reducing the acrimony asso-
ciated with dissolving marital relationships, 73 new matrimonial
weapons are being forged by judicial blacksmiths and handed
to warring couples. One of the newest weapons involves the
right of spouses to sue each other for violating the federal
wiretap law.
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968, with few exceptions, purports to prohibit any third-
party electronic eavesdropping.7 4 In pertinent part, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(1) provides that:
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any
person who-
(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or
procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to inter-
cept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication;
port and Poverty are Topics at Charleston, Child Support Rep., Dec. 1985 at 4. "Children
* . .constitute 40 percent of all poor people ...." See OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 9TH ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 5 (1984).
72. Note that the panel declined to decide this issue.
73. Domestic disputes, in particular dissolutions of marriage relationships, con-
sume a major portion of America's civil court calendars. They have escalated at an
astounding rate with the national divorce figures rising from 479,000 in 1965 to
1,200,000 in 1983. Zaal, Family Law Teaching in the No-Fault Era: A Pedagogic Proposal,
35J. LEGAL EDUC. 552, 556 (1985) (citing A.A.L.S. tape recording: Proceedings of a
Conference on the Teaching of Family Law, Tape 1, Side B (1982)).
74. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1988).
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(c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to
any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or elec-
tronic communication, knowing or having reason to know
that the information was obtained through the interception
of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of
this subsection .. .75
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.
76
Recovery for damages in a civil cause of action is authorized
by 18 U.S.C. § 2520, which provides in part:
[A]ny person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication
is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation
of this chapter may in a civil action recover from the person
or entity which engaged in that violation such relief as may
be appropriate.
77
The statutory definition of "person" includes "any individ-
ual." 78 An exception to the coverage of the act is provided for
use of an extension phone or similar device in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510:
(5) "electronic, mechanical, or other device" means any
device or apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire,
oral, or electronic communication other than-
(a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or
facility, or any component thereof, (i) furnished to the sub-
scriber or user by a provider of wire or electronic communi-
cation service in the ordinary course of its business .... 79
The question of whether the Act was intended to cover
spousal wiretapping was initially raised by a battling couple in
the Fifth Circuit.8 0 The eventual defendant, Simpson, sus-
pected his wife was unfaithful and obtained a device for tap-
ping and recording telephone conversations. He attached the
device to phone lines within his home, and intercepted conver-
sations between his wife and another man. The conversations
were "mildly compromising" establishing that the other man
was making advances, and that while the wife was resisting, she
was not doing so in a firm and final fashion. Simpson played
75. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1)(a)(c) (1988).
76. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (4)(a) (1988).
77. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (a) (1988).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (6) (1988).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (5)(a)(i) (1988).
80. Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974).
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the tapes, or portions thereof, to neighbors, family members
and for a lawyer, on whose advice the wife agreed to an uncon-
tested divorce.81
When the uncontested divorce became final, Simpson's ex-
wife brought a civil action against him under 18 U.S.C. § 2520
(1974).82 After losing her claim at the district court level, she
appealed asserting she was entitled to constitutional protec-
tions of privacy and "emerging concepts of women's rights."8 3
The Fifth Circuit firmly rejected the theory that the statute was
intended to cover domestic partners, observing:
[W]e are of the opinion that Congress did not intend such a
far-reaching result, one extending into areas normally left
to states, those of the marital home and domestic conflicts.
We reach this decision because Congress has not, in the
statute, committee reports, legislative hearings, or reported
debates indicated either its positive intent to reach so far or
an awareness that it might be doing so. Given the novelty
of a federal remedy for persons aggrieved by the personal
acts of their spouses within the marital home, and given the
severity of the remedy seemingly provided by Title III, we
seek such indications of congressional intent and awareness
before extending Title III to this case.
Our independent search of legislative materials has been
long, exhaustive, and inconclusive. To summarize the re-
sults, we have found no direct indications that Congress in-
tended so much, and only several scattered suggestions that
it was aware that the statute's inclusive language might
reach this case.8 4
The Fifth Circuit noted that not only would the result sought
by Ms. Simpson create a federal remedy for marital grievances,
but would also override the interspousal immunity for per-
sonal torts85 accorded by the majority of states.8 6
81. Id. at 804.
82. The 1974 version of 18 U.S.C. § 2520 under which Simpson sued is in sub-
stance the same as the present version. See supra text accompanying note 75.
83. Simpson, 490 F.2d at 804.
84. Id. at 805-06.
85. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 122 at 901-04 (5th ed.
1984). The common law doctrine of interspousal immunity was based on the legal
fiction of marital identity. In the eyes of the law, husband and wife were considered
one person and that person was the husband. For this reason, it was impossible at
common law to maintain a tort action between man and wife. However, husbands
and wives were always regarded as separate individuals in criminal law.
86. Discussions of the rules followed by the various states may be found in
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Two years after Simpson, the Sixth Circuit took a contrary po-
sition on an almost identical question. In United States v. Jones,
a husband was criminally indicted for allegedly intercepting,
recording, and using his wife's telephone conversations. 87 The
district court dismissed the indictment ruling that the hus-
band's conduct was not covered by the wiretap act. The Sixth
Circuit reversed, holding that:.
[T]he plain language of the section and the Act's legislative
history compels interpretation of the statute to include in-
terspousal wiretaps. It is not for this Court to question the
wisdom of Congress and to establish an implied exception
to a federal statute by judicial fiat. 88
However, the Jones panel also distinguished Simpson:
The most telling difference between this case and Simpson
however, is that we are here concerned with construing the
scope of a criminal statute. Even in states which recognize
interspousal immunity, that immunity does not apply to
criminal prosecutions. As noted above, Title III protects
the privacy of all parties to an intercepted communication,
and the fact that one party to a tapped conversation is the
spouse of the defendant should have no bearing whatsoever
on the availability of criminal penalties. 89
The Second Circuit considered the issue in Anonymous v.
Anonymous. 90 In that dispute, the couple were married in 1958
and separated in 1972. Due to the wife's unstable mental con-
dition at the time, their two minor children were temporarily
placed in their father's custody. In 1973, the wife abducted
their daughter, taking her to Florida. When later the wife re-
turned to New York, she was arrested and her visitation rights
suspended. Shortly thereafter, the family court issued an or-
der directing her to refrain from using foul and abusive lan-
guage during telephone calls to her husband and children. 9'
After the New York decree was entered, the ex-wife brought
H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS, 252-56 (1968). See also W. PROSSER &
W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, 901-04 (5th ed. 1984). See Baumrind v. Ewing, 276
S.C. 350-51, 279 S.E.2d 359-60, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). The court held:
"Domestic conflicts are traditionally and properly matters of state interest." The
conduct of a husband, in taping his wife's phone conversations was held to be "be-
yond the grasp of federal statute." Id.
87. 542 F.2d 661, 663 (6th Cir. 1976).
88. Id. at 673.
89. Id. at 672.
90. 558 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1976).
91. Id. at 678.
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an action in federal district court alleging that during the two
years preceding the divorce, her ex-husband had intercepted
and tapped her telephone conversations with their daughter,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511.92 As the case unfolded it be-
came clear that the ex-husband had purchased an automatic
telephone answering machine at a local retail store, and
plugged it into the standard telephone company jack in his
apartment. The machine answered the phone and then played
a recording of his voice, stating that the caller had forty-five
seconds in which to identify himself or herself and leave a
message. A loudspeaker attached to the machine permitted
anyone in the apartment to hear the caller.93 The ex-husband
claimed his purpose in installing the answering machine was to
avoid speaking to his ex-wife when she telephoned the children
at his apartment. If she was heard identifying herself over the
machine, one of the children, rather than the husband would
pick up the phone. Whether or not someone picked up on the
husband's end, the machine normally shut off automatically af-
ter forty-five seconds. 94
The ex-wife alleged, however, that her former husband had
instructed their son to turn a knob marked "Record" on the
machine whenever his mother called, thus surreptitiously tap-
ing her conversations beyond the forty-five second period. If
the husband was at home, the loudspeaker arrangement also
enabled him to hear the conversations in another room. If he
was not at home, he could later play back the recordings of the
conversations .95
The district court judge dismissed the wiretap claim and the
Second Circuit affirmed, observing:
[I]t appears fairly clear that although Congress's primary
concern in enacting the wire interception provisions of the
Act was with organized crime, Congress was not unaware of
the growing incidence of interspousal wiretaps, and did not
intend to blanketly except them from the Act's coverage.
The issue becomes at what point interspousal wiretaps leave
the province of mere marital disputes, a matter left to the
92. Id.
"93. The state court -had apparently issued an order forbidding the ex-husband
from being in the room where the telephone was located if his former wife was talk-
ing to one of the parties' children. Id. at 678 n.3.
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states, and rise to the level of criminal conduct proscribed
by the federal wiretap statutes .... For the reasons below,
we conclude that the facts alleged here do not rise to the
level of criminal conduct intended to be covered by the fed-
eral wiretap statutes, and hence we affirm the dismissal of
the complaint.
96
[W]e . . . assume that "nobody wants to make it a
crime" for a father to listen in on conversations between his
wife and his eight year old daughter, from his own phone, in
his own home. The fact that appellee here taped the con-
versations which he permissibly overheard, we find, as the
Fifth Circuit did in Simpson, to be a distinction without a
difference.9 7
Several years passed with little activity at the federal circuit
level. However, in 1984 the family wiretap issue arose in the
Fourth Circuit in Pritchard v. Pritchard.98 The sole question was
whether the district court erred in dismissing a civil claim by
Donald Ray Pritchard, who alleged that his ex-wife, Zee War-
ren Pritchard, had violated the Wiretap Act. Zee Warren relied
on Simpson for the proposition that the statute impliedly ex-
cluded wiretapping of the conversations of one spouse by the
other spouse; Donald Ray relied upon Jones, and Kratz v.
Kratz.99
96. Id. at 677.
97. Id. at 679 (citation omitted).
98. 732 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1984).
99. In Kratz, while their divorce proceeding was pending, the husband attached a
recording device to his wife's phone. He recorded her conversations and gathered
information about her "activities" to use in the divorce action. 477 F. Supp. 463,466
(E.D. Pa. 1979). The Kratz court held that, contrary to the husband's assertion, Con-
gress clearly prohibited interception of "all wire communications by any person ex-
cept as specifically provided by Congress." Id. at 467 (emphasis added). See Flynn v.
Flynn, 560 F. Supp. 922, 924 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (interspousal immunity doctrine still
recognized but does not determine whether a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2520 has oc-
curred); Heyman v. Heyman, 548 F. Supp. 1041, 1045 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (act prohibits
wiretapping between spouses); Citron v. Citron, 539 F. Supp. 621, 626 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (complaint dismissed on grounds that defendant's wiretapping activity was not
willful); Gill v. Wilier, 482 F. Supp. 776, 778 (W.D.N.Y. 1980) (wife had a claim
against husband who tapped her phone); Remington v. Remington, 393 F.Supp. 898,
901 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (decided in part by distinguishing Simpson factually); Rickenbaker
v. Rickenbaker, 290 N.C. 373, 381-82, 226 S.E.2d 347, 351-52 (1976) (criticized and
distinguished Simpson factually). But see Baumrind v. Ewing, 276 S.C. 350, 352-53,
279 S.E.2d 359, 360, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981) (South Carolina Supreme
Court followed Simpson). See also Comment, Interspousal Electronic Surveillance Immunity,
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The Fourth Circuit held there was no express exception for
instances of willful, unconsented to, electronic surveillance be-
tween spouses and concluded from its investigation of the leg-
islative history that the Act did cover the marital home.
Observed the court:
The Simpson court and other courts faced with the issue
have, however, examined the legislative history in an effort
to determine the intent of Congress on the issue of wiretap-
ping between spouses. In Simpson, the court concluded that
its search of legislative materials had been "long, exhaus-
tive, and inconclusive," yielding "no direct indications" that
Congress intended for the statute to reach interspousal
wiretaps conducted in the marital home although the court
had found "several scattered suggestions that [Congress]
was aware that the statute's inclusive language might reach
this case." In Jones and Kratz, however, an analysis of the
legislative history led to the conclusion that the legislative
history "evince[d] a congressional awareness of the wide-
spread use of electronic eavesdropping in domestic rela-
tions cases, and a congressional intent to prohibit such
eavesdropping." Specific references that are persuasive in-
clude the testimony before the Subcommittee on Adminis-
trative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary
Committee of Professor Robert Blakey. Blakey, who is rec-
ognized as the author of Title III, commented that "private
bugging in this country can be divided into two broad cate-
gories, commercial espionage and marital litigation."
The Kratz court found further indication of congressional
intent in comments made during the Hearings on Invasion of
Privacy Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Pro-
cedure of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Senator Long, the
chairman of the subcommittee, "noted that the three major
areas in which private electronic surveillance was wide-
spread were '(1) industrial (2) divorce cases, and (3)
politics.' "
Another explicit acknowledgment of the scope of the stat-
ute is found in the comments of Senator Hruska, joined in
by Senators Dirksen, Scott and Thurmond that "[a] broad
prohibition is imposed on private use of electronic surveil-
lance, particularly in domestic relations and industrial espi-
onage situations."
... [W]e find that Title III prohibits all wiretapping activi-
ties unless specifically excepted. There is no express excep-
tion for instances of willful, unconsented to electronic
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surveillance between spouses. Nor is there any indication in
the statutory language or in the legislative history that Con-
gress intended to imply an exception to facts involving in-
terspousal wiretapping.'
0 0
With these competing views, the stage was set for the Eighth
Circuit's input. Its opportunity came in Kempfv. Kempf when a
federal district court in Missouri dismissed a claim brought by
Jillian Kempf against her former husband Karl seeking civil
damages under the Wiretap Act.' 0 ' The couple were living to-
gether in Missouri when Karl suspected Jillian of having extra-
marital affairs. To confirm his suspicions, Karl intercepted and
recorded her telephone conversations by connecting a cassette
tape recorder to the receiver of an extension phone in plain
view in the basement of the couple's home. The recorded con-
versations confirmed Karl's worst suspicions, and he filed for
divorce. In the divorce proceeding, tapes ofJillian's conversa-
tions were admitted as evidence over her objection.
0 2
The marriage was dissolved. Two weeks following entry of
the divorce decree, hostilities resumed when Jillian filed suit
against Karl in Missouri Federal District Court. She alleged
that Karl had violated her right to privacy under Title III, 18
U.S.C. § 2511. She sought compensatory and punitive dam-
ages plus attorney fees. The district court dismissed, relying
on the reasoning in Simpson.' 0 Jillian took the domestic battle
to the Eighth Circuit.
A unanimous Eighth Circuit panel reversed the district
court, distinguished White v. Weiss, 10 4 and rejected the Fifth
Circuit's wiretap view. Observed the court:
Karl would have us insulate him from civil liability on the
basis of our ruling in White v. Weiss, where we applied Title
III to a domestic situation and found liability on the part of
a third party detective. However, because we'did not ad-
dress or speculate whether Title III would reach inter-
spousal wiretapping when a third party was not involved,
White does not answer the question presented here.
100. 732 F.2d at 373-74 (citations omitted).
101. Kempfv. Kempf, 868 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1989).
102. Id. at 971 (Missouri apparently does not apply a pure no-fault standard in
divorce proceedings).
103. Id.
104. In White, the husband hired a private detective to tap his wife's conversations
in their home. The court distinguished Simpson and held that private detectives hired
by a spouse are not exempted from the Act. 535 F.2d 1067, 1071 (8th Cir. 1976).
19901
23
Oliphant and Oliphant: Domestic Relations and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1990
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
We agree with the Fourth Circuit's conclusion in Pritchard
v. Pritchard.
Title III prohibits all wiretapping activities unless spe-
cifically excepted. There is no express exception for
instances of willful, unconsented to electronic surveil-
lance between spouses. Nor is there any indication in
the statutory language or in the legislative history that
Congress intended to imply an exception to facts in-
volving interspousal wiretapping.
...[W]e find no legal basis in Title III or its legislative
history to insulate a spouse in this situation from the Title's
reach or its civil penalties, we hold that the conduct of a
spouse in wiretapping the telephone communications of the
other spouse within the marital home, falls within its
purview. 10 5
No sboner had the ink dried on Kempf, when a variation on
the family wiretapping theme came before the Eighth Circuit.
This dispute arose out of a custody and visitation battle involv-
ing the four year-old daughter of Stuart and Angela Platt.1
06
The Missouri state court had allowed Stuart to maintain regu-
lar phone contact (three times per week) with the four-year-old
while the couple's divorce petition was pending. However,
when Stuart called to talk with the child, her mother, Angela,
apparently recorded the conversations. When Stuart discov-
ered that Angela was listening in on the conversations between
him and his daughter, he filed suit in federal district court.
In his complaint, Stuart alleged that Angela " 'installed a
tape recording device on [her] telephone in order to intercept,
monitor, and record telephone calls' made by 'Stuart to their
minor child' to gain an advantage in their dissolution proceed-
ing." 0 7 Stewart contended that he neither authorized Angela
to listen in on the conversations, nor expressly or impliedly
105. Kempf, 868 F.2d at 973 (citations omitted) (quoting Pritchard v. Pritchard,
732 F.2d 372, 374 (4th Cir. 1984)).
106. Platt v. Platt, 685 F. Supp. 208 (E.D. Mo. 1988), rev'd, 873 F.2d 1447 (8th Cir.
1989). In an unpublished opinion the Eighth Circuit noted that the issues in Platt
were similar to those in Kempf, and accordingly reversed and remanded. No. 88-
1983, slip op. at 2 (8th Cir. Feb. 22, 1989). After dismissal by the district court,
Stuart Platt again appealed to the Eighth Circuit. Platt v. Platt, No. 88-1983, slip op.
(8th Cir. May 10, 1989).
107. Platt v. Platt, No. 88-1983, slip op. at 2 (8th Cir. May 10, 1989).
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consented to the installation of the recording mechanism. An-
gela moved to dismiss Stewart's complaint, arguing she did not
violate the Wiretap Act because, as natural mother and legal
guardian of the minor child, she stood in the place of the mi-
nor child and consented to the recording. Furthermore, she
contended that the child was not a "person" within the mean-
ing of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(6) and that the claim was barred by
interspousal immunity. The Eighth Circuit remanded to deter-
mine the exact nature of the recording device itself, as well as
the method and manner of the recording that took place. It
distinguished between wiretapping and eavesdropping by
means of an extension phone.'08
The Eighth Circuit's view which removes interspousal immu-
nity from electronic wiretapping can be sustained on several
bases. For example, to the extent that the decision promotes
the extension of the "individual rights-centered" philosophy
into the family unit, it achieves this objective. Furthermore, if
spousal wiretapping posed a serious menace to individual pri-
vacy within the family home, the menace has been reduced, at
least within the Eighth Circuit. Moreover, the Kempf view of
spousal wiretapping finds itself in fashionable company in
terms of fostering the expansion of tort actions between indi-
viduals within the family. 10 9
On the other hand, one might ask, is it time to exercise
greater caution before shifting more power away from the fam-
ily as a unit to the individuals within it? Especially, should the
shift continue at a time when the American family is facing
problems never before encountered? Is it time, as some argue,
to undertake major efforts to strengthen, rather than weaken
the basic fabric of the family unit?
The Kempf decision moves too quickly to a result without ap-
propriate in-depth reflection on its ultimate consequences. It
may not be desirable, for example, for persons living in such
close proximity to each other to bring claims which interfere
with the essential fabric of that relationship. There are, after
108. Id. at 5. The Eighth Circuit based its distinction on the amount of human
supervision necessary. "Extension phone eavesdropping requires a greater degree
of human supervision, the presence of the eavesdropper.... In contrast, wiretapping
requires only a minimum of human supervision .. " Platt v. Platt, No. 88-1983, slip
op. at 5 (8th Cir. May 10, 1989).
109. See, e.g., L. KARP & C. KARP, DOMESTIC TORTS, FAMILY VIOLENCE, CONFLICT
AND SEXUAL ABUSE (1989).
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all, intrinsic values within the family, such as sharing informa-
tion in and out of the family abode, that application of the
wiretap statute may impede. Philosophically, Kempf reduces
the authority of the family, weakens the partners' marital com-
mitment, and further erodes both family stability and
importance.
From our perspective, the Eighth Circuit should have bal-
anced the injvry to the family unit caused by spousal wiretap-
ping without liability against the potential injury with liability.
Is it necessary, for example, to prohibit wiretapping because it
fosters an outmoded view of male dominated households? Or,
because it aids in protecting partners and children from abuse
by other family members? Does not the real answer to the
wiretap issue lie in a deeper understanding of family dynamics?
For example, what is the impact of the decision on the follow-
ing view of the family?
From one perspective, a family can be defined as a commu-
nity unto itself consisting of a small, relatively permanent
group of people. A family is "any group of persons closely
related by blood, as parents, children, uncles, aunts, and cous-
ins" or "a group of persons who form a household under one
head, including parents and children," '" 0 who share and expe-
rience the whole range of human problems and human
emotions.
Family members experience continual responsibilities and
obligations toward each other and develop a sense of belong-
ing, from being a member of the family unit. They often share
the same name, many of the same sources of pleasure and
grief, the same collective reputation, and often face the same
sources of conflict. Agreements and disagreements are usually
resolved within the family. The most fundamental apprecia-
tion of human qualities and values occurs within the family.
Values such as truth, empathy, cruelty, indifference, impartial-
ity and many others find their root in the family. A family pro-
vides economic security and long term assurance that permit
role division in terms of career and child raising."'I Perhaps
110. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 696 (2d ed.
1987).
111. B.. HOGGETr & D. PEARL, THE FAMILY, LAW AND SOCIETY, CASES AND MATERI-
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the Eighth Circuit has a different view of the family and its dy-
namic character. The court, however, did not attempt to iden-
tify the "real" factors involved in the Kempf decision. A
definition and examination of today's family is the starting
point. Instead, the court relied on a cold reading of congres-
sional history- one clearly ambiguous-and reached an unsat-
isfactory result. An analysis of the effect wiretapping has on
families would be far more helpful.
IV. PROTECTING THE FAMILY FROM THE STATE
During the past two decades the composition of the Ameri-
can family has changed significantly because divorce is more
readily available. Simultaneously, the state's relationship to
the family has changed dramatically. Large bureaucracies have
been created at substantial taxpayer expense to help troubled
families solve their difficulties. An increased awareness of do-
mestic violence and child abuse has generated a large body of
state law. Correspondingly, state agencies have been ex-
panded to investigate and resolve claims made by one family
member against another.
A proliferation of agencies, complex laws, and widespread
invasion by the state of a family's privacy create special
problems for the courts. Furthermore, as the state increases
its role as guardian and protector of family members, addi-
tional problems are created for the courts when the family re-
lies on the state to properly carry out its assumed duties. To
whom are families to turn when the state wrongfully invades
their privacy? What is the remedy when a state fails to carry
out a duty it has voluntarily assumed? And, in the context of
the increasingly large and powerful bureaucratic machinery, is
there any forum in which a citizen may effectively obtain
redress?
One purpose of this section is to examine a number of
Eighth Circuit decisions which involved claims of family mem-
bers against the state. Our analysis is directed at discovering
the conditions under which the Eight Circuit will act.
The sensitive issue of child abuse has raised its unbecoming
head in the Eighth Circuit in the context of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
actions by parents demanding redress from the state"12 claim-
112. For convenience, we will refer to the state as the party being sued, although
1990]
27
Oliphant and Oliphant: Domestic Relations and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1990
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
ing it improperly interfered with the care, companionship, and
love of family members. The court of appeals' treatment of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 disputes plays a significant role in terms of state
agency funding, personnel training," 3 and the creation of
rules and guidelines for effective supervision." 14 Moreover, its
views provide citizens with either increased or decreased pro-
tection from abuses of state power at a time when allegations
of abuse are increasing, and community hysteria regarding
child abuse is escalating. The need for the Eighth Circuit to
impartially and vigilantly stand between the government and
its citizens is never more immediate than when child abuse is
the issue.' 15
With rare exception, families seeking redress by bringing a
section 1983 action have little chance of being heard by the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The time is ripe, how-
ever, for the court to review its hands-off policy. Of particular
concern is the community-wide atmosphere of hysteria gener-
states, government agents, and municipalities are all possible defendants under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. The conduct of state officials may also make them personally liable
for damages under § 1983. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167: 172 (1961); Ex Parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) (basis for injunctive relief against the state).
Municipalities may also be sued under § 1983 for damages and injunctive relief,
where the complaint alleges that the execution of a "policy or custom" of the munici-
pality led to the injury in question. See Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs', 436 U.S. 658,
694 (1978). However, a state cannot be liable for damages under § 1983 because of
the eleventh amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S.
1, 21 (1890) (Harlan, J., concurring); Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378,
381-82 (1798).
113. See City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989). The Court held: "The
inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where
the failure to train in a relevant respect amounts to deliberate indifference to the
constitutional rights of persons with whom the police come into contact." Id. at
1199. See also Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824-25 n.8 (1985).
114. Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981). In
Doe, a child brought an action under § 1983 alleging that her constitutional rights
had been violated when the agency which placed her in a foster home failed to ade-
quately supervise her placement and, as a result, she was raped and beaten by her
foster father.
115. There are several authors who argue that the state has a duty to provide
certain benefits to the oppressed and the impoverished. See, e.g., Michelman, Fore-
word: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969);
Miller, Toward a Concept of Constitutional Duty, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 198. Miller proposes
that the judiciary is creating an affirmative constitutional duty which obligates gov-
ernment to act in situations concerning racial relations, legislative reapportionment,
administration of criminal law, and administrative law.
However, the authors of this article do not agree with the proposition that gov-
ernment has an affirmative duty to act. See Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional
Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864 (1986).
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ated by disputes involving abuse and the fear that state courts
will not adequately protect a citizen when this occurs.
To illustrate our point, the Minnesota Court of Appeals re-
cently described the community "hysteria" that is associated
with child abuse claims:
There is a certain hysteria which has arisen in roughly the
last decade concerning child abuse. Although serious,
when ranked with homicide, aggravated assaults, armed
robbery, burglaries, drug dealing, and other felonies, abuse
does not occupy a special or sacrosanct position which puts
it apart from the normal rules and codes of conduct, includ-
ing the Bill of Rights. Yet, no other crimes seem shrouded
with the mystique of child abuse. All normal concerns for
persons' rights get overridden when someone says, "but
we're protecting little children." No matter how heinous
the crime, it is antithetical to our judicial system that the
innocent can be punished lest an occasional guilty one
escape." 1
6
Is the "hysteria" playing a subtle but nevertheless pivotal
role in the Eighth Circuit's rejection of section 1983 actions
where the state is a defendant? Or, is the court justified in its
view that children need to be protected at all costs even if in-
nocent family members are occasionally sacrificed? A need to
reexamine the Eighth Circuit's perspective comes at a time
when the American family has been afforded constitutional
protection by the United States Supreme Court. The Court
has held that a constitutionally recognized liberty interest exits
between parents and children in the care and companionship
of each other." 7 It has also said that "[t]he relationship of
love and duty in a recognized family unit is an interest in lib-
erty entitled to constitutional protection."'"1 8 In Stanley v. Illi-
nois," 9 the Court declared that the interest of an unmarried
father "in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably war-
rants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest,
protection." 20
The interests of a parent in the companionship, care, cus-
tody and management of his or her children are said by the
116. R.S. v. State, 447 N.W.2d 205, 212 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
117. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 258 (1983).
118. Id.
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Supreme Court to "come to this Court with a momentum for
respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive
merely from shifting economic arrangements."' 2' Frequently,
the Court has emphasized the importance of the family, where
the right to conceive and to raise one's children is deemed "es-
sential"' 22 and one of the "basic civil rights of man"' 23 involv-
ing "rights far more precious .. .than property rights."'124 In
addition, the Court has noted, "It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the par-
ents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation
for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."'
125
Protections for the integrity of the family unit are found in
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, 26 the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, 127 and
the ninth amendment. 28 The liberty interest in family privacy
has its "source" and its "contours," not in state law, but in
intrinsic human rights as they have been understood in "this
Nation's history and tradition."'
2 9
Despite the constitutional dimensions of the family and pro-
fuse statements concerning its importance, the Supreme Court
has declared that the rights and liberty interests of the family
are not absolute, particularly when minor children are in-
volved. The Court has reasoned that, "[t]he intangible fibers
that connect parent and child have infinite variety.... It is self-
evident that they are sufficiently vital to merit constitutional
protection in appropriate cases." s°
The Eighth Circuit has recognized that the privacy and au-
121. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
122. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
123. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
124. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953).
125. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (citing Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
126. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
127. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
128. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
129. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); accord Smith v. Organiza-
tion of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977).
130. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983). See also Backlund v. Barnhart,
778 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1985). In Backlund, the court noted that parents have no
clearly established right to unlimited exercise of religious beliefs on their children;
the state, as parens patriae, may for example, enforce school attendance, prohibit child
labor and require vaccination. Id. at 1389.
[Vol. 16
30
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol16/iss3/5
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
tonomy of familial relationships are among the interests which
due process protects. Moreover, the court has said it can con-
ceive of no more important relationship, no more basic bond
in American society, than the tie between parent and child.' 31
It faces the dilemma, however, of what to do when the consti-
tutionally protected family interests collide with the state's in-
terest in protecting children. On this point, the court of
appeals has balanced the liberty interest in familial relations
against the compelling state interest in protecting minor chil-
dren, particularly in circumstances where state action is consid-
ered necessary to protect the children from parents
themselves. 1
3 2
The Seventh Circuit, has discussed the meaning of clearly
established rights. It suggested that if the existence of a right
or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is
subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered
"clearly established," unless there is closely corresponding fac-
tual and legal precedent. l33 The Eighth Circuit, as evidenced
by Myers v. Morris,13 4 supports this view. It said, "[w]here the
state asserts a compelling interest for intruding into the plain-
tiff's privacy, the balance may weigh against protection of the
right, and the intrusion may be justified."' 3 5 Consequently,
the Eighth Circuit seldom permits a family member to bring a
section 1983 action against the state, if the state's claimed mis-
behavior involved protecting a child from abuse. Section 1983
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 creates a federal cause of action
against state officials who deprive citizens 'of their constitu-
tional rights.' 3 6 It renders individual state officials liable for
131. Bohn v. County of Dakota, 772 F.2d 1433, 1439 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1014 (1986).
132. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Williamson, 787 F.2d 403 (8th Cir. 1986).
133. Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848
(1986). See also Snyder v. Kurvers, 767 F.2d 489, 497-98 (8th Cir. 1985).
134. Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828 (1987).
135. Id. at 1463.
136. A § 1983 plaintiff must also show that the defendant was an individual who
acted under color of state law. This condition is satisfied if the individual's conduct
constitutes "state action" for the purposes of the fourteenth amendment. See Lugar
v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 & n.18 (1982).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), enacted as § 1979 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, was
originally a part of the general civil rights legislation passed by Congress following
the Civil War in an effort to give substantive freedom to the emancipated slaves. This
essential purpose was noted in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
(1873), wherein the Supreme Court noted that the "one pervading purpose" of the
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wrongfully depriving citizens of "any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws ...."137
The Eighth Circuit's current view was sculptured from a line
of cases beginning with Bohn v. County of Dakota.138 In Bohn,
parents who were suspected of child abuse challenged the in-
vestigating procedures used by Dakota County, Minnesota.13 9
The Bohns claimed that the county denied them due process
by failing to provide them with notice of a finding of child
abuse, a statement of the basis for that finding, and notice of
their right to appeal. 40 They also argued that various other
administrative procedures for contesting or appealing a child
abuse finding were deficient.
14 1
The claims arose out of an incident when the father, Wayne
Bohn, forcibly broke up a fight between his two sons, one of
whom then ran to a neighbor's house. An investigation was
launched by the Dakota County Department of Social Services,
which concluded that there was "substantial evidence" of fam-
ily child abuse.142 The Bohns disputed the conclusion, and the
Department of Social Services assigned a child protection
worker to the family. The worker met with the family on nu-
merous occasion. and apparently was unsuccessful in resolving
the presumed problems stemming from the alleged child
abuse. "4
3
Subsequently, the Bohns attempted to clear the record of
the charges lodged against them. Initially they complained to
the County Department of Social Services, explaining that they
wanted to include their side of the story in the decision-making
process. The department refused to hear them claiming the
thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments was "the freedom of the slave race,
the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-
made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who formerly exercised un-
limited dominion over him." Id. at 71.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
138. Bohn v. County of Dakota, 772 F.2d 1433, 1439 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1014 (1986).
139. MINN. STAT. § 626.556 (1988) (reporting of maltreatment of minors).
140. Bohn, 772 F.2d at 1434.
14L "In addition to MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556, the statutes implicated in the
Bohns' challenge to the administrative procedures for reviewing [the lower court's
finding against them] include MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.04 and § 14.57-§ 14.70 as well
as certain administrative rules." Id. at 1434 n.2.
142. Despite this conclusion, the allegedly abused Bohn boy was examined by a
physician who found no evidence of abuse or injury. Id. at 1434 n.3.
143. Id. at 1434-35.
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investigation was complete. Thereafter, the Bohns sought to
correct the record through a variety of other means, including
a juvenile court action, an appeal to the State Department of
Public Welfare, an appeal of the juvenile action to the Dakota
County District Court, to the Minnesota Supreme Court, and
requests for action through the Dakota County Human Serv-
ices Board, their county commissioner, and their state repre-
sentative. When these measures were unavailing, they filed a
section 1983 action in federal district court charging that the
procedures employed by the state left them without an oppor-
tunity .to clear their name of the charges brought by the
state. 144 The Bohn's action was dismissed by the district court
and they appealed.
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
initially recognized that a family has a constitutionally pro-
tected interest, specifically noting that:
[T]he Bohns have a protectible interest in their reputations
at stake in this case. By identifying the Bohns as child abus-
ers, investigating the quality of their family life, and main-
taining data on them, the County Department exposed
them to public opprobrium and may have damaged their
standing in the community.
In Wisconsin v. Constantineau, the Supreme Court held that
"Where the State attaches a 'badge of infamy' to the citizen,
due process comes into play.... Where a person's good
name, reputation, honor or integrity is at stake because of
what the government is doing to him, notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard are essential."...
... When the County Department found Bohn to be a
child abuser, it drove a wedge into this family and
threatened its very foundation. The stigma Mr. Bohn suf-
fers as a reported child abuser undoubtedly has eroded the
family's solidarity internally and impaired the family's abil-
ity to function in the community. In light of these clear ad-
verse effects on familial integrity and stability, we find that
Mr. Bohn's reputation is a protectible interest.145
However, the court was not persuaded it should hear their dis-
pute. It concluded that the State of Minnesota had afforded
the Bohns sufficient procedural avenues to clear their name
144. Id. at 1435.
145. Bohn, 772 F.2d at 1436 n.4 (citations omitted).
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and affirmed the dismissal.' 46
The most widely discussed decision of its kind in the circuit
is Myers v. Morris, 147 which involved sensationalized child sex
abuse allegations. An investigation of alleged sexual abuse of
a minor child residing with her parents led to numerous child
sex abuse complaints. Ultimately, there were 108 counts of
sexual abuse filed involving many children and parents. Some
children were interviewed numerous times over several
months before acknowledging that they had been abused.
48
Eventually, however, all of the charges against the adults
were dismissed and some of the children later recanted their
accusations. The prosecutor claimed the dismissal was neces-
sary to avoid compromising an investigation of greater magni-
tude. After the investigation was completed with no charges
being filed, the sex abuse charges were not reinstated, conse-
quently the resolution of this case remains in limbo.
49
Some of the parents accused of child abuse brought a sec-
tion 1983 action in federal district court alleging, inter alia, that
the prosecutor fabricated charges, coerced testimony, and
withheld and destroyed evidence while pursuing the allega-
tions against families. The district court dismissed the com-
plaint and the Eighth Circuit upheld the dismissal on several
grounds. In addition to shielding the state from the section
1983 claims by application of prosecutorial immunity, the
court of appeals made it clear that negligent conduct by state
officials was not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Observed
the court:
The Supreme Court has recently concluded that negli-
gent conduct by state actors does not implicate any aspect
of the due process clause. Thus allegations that the sheriff
or other defendants deprived plaintiffs of procedural or
substantive due process interests through negligent or
"grossly negligent" conduct does not state a claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.150
The Myers decision has played a pervasive role in subsequent
decisions. For example, it heavily influenced the outcome in
146. Id. at 1439.
147. 810 F.2d 1437 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828 (1987).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1440-45.
150. Id. at 1468 (citations omitted).
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Doe v. State,15' where a section 1983 complaint against Henne-
pin County, the City of Mound, Minnesota, and various agen-
cies and individuals engaged in social work was dismissed by
the district court. The district court was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. In Doe, parents claimed that
their civil rights were violated by the state's inadequate re-
sponse following reports of sexual abuse of their children.
The parents asserted that if proper procedures had been fol-
lowed, they would not have suffered a traumatic sixteen day
separation from their children.1
52
Apparently, city and county agencies had ignored both statu-
tory and administrative regulations by failing to: (1) investigate
the first report of child sexual abuse within twenty-four hours;
(2) offer the plaintiffs an opportunity to voluntarily place their
children; and (3) offer protective services before removing the
children. The court of appeals held that assuming the state
acted as the plaintiffs alleged, a violation of state statutes and
regulations was not the source of a liberty interest or property
entitlement giving rise to a constitutional claim.
153
Lux v. Hansen, 154 followed the Doe and Myers cases and was
similarly resolved. In Lux, the court of appeals upheld a sum-
mary judgment dismissal of a section 1983 action declaring
that a social worker and the employing agency were protected
from the aggrieved parents' civil rights claim as long as there
was no evidence of "malice" or "improper motive." The court
could find no evidence of a policy or custom upon which liabil-
ity was predicated or of a failure by the employer to properly
supervise its employees. It observed:
A government official is entitled to the defense of qualified
immunity, unless he has violated clearly established statu-
tory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known....
• . . As we held in Myers, "the parental liberty interest in
keeping the family unit intact is not a clearly established
right in the context of reasonable suspicion that parents
may be abusing children."
. . . Although the facts, especially when viewed in hind-
151. 858 F.2d 1325 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3161 (1989).
152. Id. at 1328.
153. Id. at 1328-29. See also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); Griffin
v. Hilke, 804 F.2d 1052, 1055 (8th Cir. 1986).
154. Lux v. Hansen, 886 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989).
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sight, lend themselves to alternative interpretations, they
were sufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion that [the mi-
nor child] had been sexually abused by her father. Accord-
ingly, we find no evidence of malice or improper motives
that might defeat such immunity.'
55
In a dispute closely-related to but distinct from the child
abuse cases, Betty Jean Harpole, a grandmother whose four
small children died in tragic circumstances, sought a hearing
under section 1983.156 The action was commenced after two
of her grandchildren died from Sudden Infant Death Syn-
drome and two others died as a result of apnea. 157 Her claims
arose out of the death of two and one-half month-old Gary
Demay, the last of the four tragic infant deaths.
Gary was born on November 19, 1983 to Betty Demay, the
plaintiff's adopted daughter, who was also mother of the other
three deceased children. Shortly after Gary arrived home with
his mother following his birth, he was readmitted to the Arkan-
sas Children's Hospital to determine if he was apnea prone.
After a series of tests, Gary's doctors indicated the likelihood
that he was prone to apnea. Gary was discharged from the
hospital on December 15, 1983 even though some hospital
personnel were uncomfortable with the discharge.1
58
On January 8 and 14, 1984, Gary returned to the hospital
after he stopped breathing. Within a short time after each ad-
mission, Gary was discharged to his mother's care. On Febru-
ary 8, 1984, he stopped breathing and died. On that day
Gary's mother had forgotten to activate the apnea monitor,
which would have sounded an alarm when Gary's breathing
stopped. 
59
Harpole filed suit on her own behalf and as administratrix of
Gary's estate, alleging that his first, fourth, eighth, ninth, and
fourteenth amendment rights were violated because the hospi-
155. Id. at 1066-67 (citations omitted).
156. Harpole v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 820 F.2d 923 (8th Cir. 1987).
157. The court defined apnea as "a sudden suspension of breathing." Id. at 924
n.2. Apnea is also defined as "a temporary suspension of breathing." WEBSTER'S
NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 85 (2d ed. 1983).
158. Harpole, 820 F.2d at 924. When the child was admitted to the hospital, the
Arkansas Department of Social Services was notified of possible parental abuse and
neglect. The Pulaski County North Office of Social Services conducted an investiga-
tion and found no evidence of abuse or neglect. Id.
159. Id. She had also forgotten to turn on the monitor the day her third child
stopped breathing and died. Id.
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tal violated duties imposed by Arkansas statutes and Titles IV
and XX of the Social Security Act. The district court held that,
at best, her complaint stated only a negligence claim and to the
extent that it sought to require state officials to enforce state
law, it was barred by the eleventh amendment.
On appeal, Harpole argued that the hospital was deliber-
ately indifferent to Gary's condition and as a result his consti-
tutional rights were violated. The Eighth Circuit rejected her
claims, stating:
At best, defendants may have been negligent when re-
turning Gary to his mother's care, but negligence is not ac-
tionable under § 1983. The State of Arkansas does not
have a duty to provide around-the-clock services to every
sick child, nor must it monitor family relationships closely
enough to prevent children from being injured by the negli-
gence of their parents.
The state does not have a duty enforceable by the fed-
eral courts to maintain a police force or a fire depart-
ment, or to protect children from their parents. The
men who framed the original Constitution and the
Fourteenth Amendment were worried about govern-
ment's oppressing the citizenry rather than about its
failing to provide adequate social services.'
60
The court of appeals' consistent refusal to allow section
1983 actions against the state is reflected in its recent decision,
McCuen v. Polk County.' 6 1 Sharon McCuen, mother of five year-
old Gloria Kirkpatrick, brought a section 1983 action as next
friend to Gloria and on her own behalf. She sought an award
of damages against the state for denying their rights by em-
ploying improper procedures to obtain ex parte orders which
temporarily removed the child from its mother's home. The
federal district court granted summary judgment and an ap-
peal was taken. 1
62
The state had stepped in when McCuen took Gloria to the
hospital for treatment of injuries McCuen claimed were suf-
fered in a fall at a neighbor's house. Gloria was admitted to
the hospital by the examining physician, who believed the inju-
ries were the result of sexual abuse. A review of the evidence
160. Id. at 926 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs.,
812 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1987)) (citations omitted).
161. 893 F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1990).
162. Id. at 173.
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and an investigation of the incident, convinced a Polk County
juvenile court officer that the abuser was Gloria's great uncle
who lived in her home. The officer sought and obtained an ex
parte order temporarily placing Gloria in the custody of the
Iowa Department of Human Services, Foster Care Division. 63
Following an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court termi-
nated the temporary removal and Gloria returned to the
McCuen home with the proviso that there be no contact be-
tween Gloria and her uncle. Believing that Gloria was still in
danger, an assistant Polk County attorney, and Gloria's court
appointed guardian ad litem, obtained a second ex parte order
staying the referee's decision and authorizing them to remove
Gloria from the home on the same day she was returned. At a
subsequent hearing, the juvenile court found that the uncle
was no longer living in the McCuen home and ordered Gloria
returned to her mother.' 64 McCuen commenced the section
1983 action alleging that the second ex parte order was the re-
sult of an official policy of the county and violated her constitu-
tional rights. '6
5
The Eighth Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal on
the ground that it could find no support for the claim that the
defendants acted in accordance with official policy and that the
social worker involved was entitled to good faith qualified im-
munity.166 It did not reach the absolute immunity issue.'
67
Ruge v. City of Bellevue 168 is a recent Eighth Circuit section
1983 case decided in sharp contrast to McCuen. Ruge con-
tended that the City of Bellevue, Nebraska violated her civil
rights and those of her deceased son by causing his death. Her
son was an employee of the city's sewer department and was
killed when a fourteen foot ditch he was working in collapsed.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 173.
165. Id. at 173. "Polk County is subject to liability under § 1983 only if the al-
leged constitutional deprivation is the result of an official policy of the county." See
City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121 (1988) (citing Monell v. Dep't of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)).
166. McCuen, 893 F.2d at 174. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
The Court said, "qualified immunity from personal liability may be extended to offi-
cial after review of 'objective legal reasonableness' of official's conduct in light of
then 'clearly established law.' " Id. at 639.
167. McCuen, 893 F.2d at 174. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 5f5 (1978)
(when officials perform prosecutorial-type functions, they receive absolute immunity
for those actions). Id.
168. 892 F.2d 738 (8th Cir. 1989).
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Ruge alleged that the city had a policy of not shoring up the
ditches in which it required employees to work and failed to
warn them of the dangers. She argued that the policy deprived
her son of his life in violation of his fifth amendment right to
substantive due process.
169
The district court dismissed the complaint finding the claims
merely conclusory and lacking in allegations of fact that could
establish such a policy. It held that "in order for negligence to
rise to the level of a constitutional violation sufficient to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted under § 1983, the
plaintiff must allege a policy of reckless disregard, deliberate
indifference, or gross negligence on the part of the City."'
170
Surprisingly, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit re-
versed, observing:
[T]he plaintiff alleged that the City has formulated and ad-
hered to a long standing policy of not shoring up the walls
of ditches into which it sends its employees, that the City
knew of the dangers of such conduct, that it continued to
require its employees to work in such ditches, and that it
intentionally failed to warn those employees of the dangers
involved in such work. Viewing these allegations in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, we cannot say that it is
beyond doubt that the plaintiff will be unable to prove any
set of facts in support of her claim that would entitle her to
relief.
We note that the complaint alleges conduct of the City
being taken "by and through its agents." However, as
counsel acknowledged on appeal, liability for the actions or
conduct of its agents cannot be extended to the City solely
on a theory of respondeat superior. 171
It explained that although the complaint failed to allege spe-
cific facts establishing the city's practice as anything more than
a single incident from which an inference of an unconstitu-
tional policy may not be taken,' 72 a single incident may estab-
lish municipal liability. ' 73 According to the opinion, the crucial
question, is whether the action that caused the loss was taken
169. Id. at 739.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 740 & n.2 (citations omitted).
172. Id. at 740.n.3. See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 821-24 (1985).
173. Ruge, 892 F.2d at 740 n.3. See Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480
(1986) (decisions or conduct of municipal policy makers on a single occasion could
constitute a "policy" and provide the grounds for § 1983 liability).
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pursuant to a policy of the municipality. 74 The court
reasoned:
The death of Curt Manke while working for the City does
not, in itself, violate the Constitution. The constitutional vi-
olation occurs when his death is caused by an inadequate
municipal policy, adopted with the requisite culpability. It
is then that an abuse of government authority arises suffi-
cient to state a cause of action under section 1983.
Thus, where the state abuses its governmental power
through an alleged policy of actively placing a person into a
situation of known danger the Constitution proscribes and
limits such action. . . . However, where the state simply
commits a tort, there is no misuse of government power
when "the event, however tragic, was an accident neither
the occurrence of which nor the particular victim of which
could have been predicted." We deem a policy, if adopted
and proven, that would show a city actively pursued conduct
which was deliberately indifferent to the constitutional
rights of its citizens, would reach constitutional dimensions
and be actionable under the Civil Rights Act. In the present
case, the plaintiff has alleged such a policy and, therefore,
has satisfied the "state action" requirement for purposes of
rule 12(b)(6).175
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep 't Social Serus. ,176 recently de-
cided by the United States Supreme Court, reinforces the view
that section 1983 actions are not likely to be successful vehicles
for citizen use against state officials to redress grievances re-
sulting from either state action or inaction. The DeShaney
Court ruled that while the State of Wisconsin may have under-
taken to protect an abused child from harm caused by his fa-
ther, it did not have a constitutional duty to protect the child
against his father's violence.
77
Ruge provides the only immediate theoretical basis for suc-
cessfully bringing a section 1983 action. Citizens must show,
however, that there is a "formulated" and "long standing"
policy, which led to the family member's injury, or alterna-
tively, an "inadequate" policy. However, McCuen illustrates
the difficulty of successfully pursuing relief even on this theory.
The Eighth Circuit's conservative approach, reinforced by
174. See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483-84.
175. Ruge, 892 F.2d at 741 n.6, 741-42 (citations omitted).
176. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
177. Id. at 1006-07.
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the Supreme Court, strongly suggests that state courts are
friendlier forums to seek redress for state violations of family
rights, despite a fear that state courts lack constitutional exper-
tise. Furthermore, they are better forums, despite the fact that
they may be subject to political and legislative prejudices that
hinder fair presentation or bar the possibility of adequate re-
covery for injury.
For example, in R.S. v. State,178 the Minnesota Court of Ap-
peals held that a county had violated a number of statutory
procedures while conducting an investigation of alleged child
abuse and that the aggrieved parents had standing to sue.'
79
Expressing outrage at the behavior of various state officials,
the court declared:
We express a special concern for the actions of the civil ser-
vants and educators involved, including, but without limita-
tion, the deliberate backdating of official reports, and the
practice at the time of signing statutorily required notices in
blank. The performance of mandated duties can be accom-
plished without resorting to such tactics. In the long run,
"ends justifies means" ultimately leads to proper ends not
being obtained, as the improper means subvert the
process. 18 0
Interestingly, a concurring judge suggested that federal
court was a more appropriate forum for resolving the dispute
and that a section 1983 action would be successful,' 8 ' rejecting
arguments by counsel that the Eighth Circuit holdings in Doe v.
State, 182 and Myers v. Morris,'83 precluded a section 1983 ac-
tion.'8 4 However, our review of the Eighth Circuit's decisions
over the past few years leads us to agree with counsel and to
respectfully disagree with the state court.
Presently, families lack an effective federal forum in which
they can protect themselves from inappropriate invasions by
the state, especially when child abuse is alleged. False child
abuse charges can ruin reputations overnight, and disrupt fam-
ily relationships. Sensationalized press coverage of abuse in-
178. R.S. v. State, 447 N.W.2d 205 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
179. Id. at 212. (court based decision on MINN. STAT. § 626.556, subd. 10(c)
(1986)).
180. Id. at 212 n.1.
181. Id. at 213 n.l.
182. 858 F.2d 1325 (8th Cir. 1988).
183. 810 F.2d 1437 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828 (1987).
184. R.S. v. State, 447 N.W.2d at 213 n.l.
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vestigations adds to the enormous potential for community
bias and prejudice. It is imperative that state agencies be re-
quired to adhere to policies and procedures designed not only
to protect children from abuse but also to protect the family
unit from unfair treatment. The Eighth Circuit should recog-
nize the important role it plays in promoting the rights of citi-
zens enveloped in this kind of atmosphere and reignite an
interest in preserving those rights.
V. CUSTODY OF CHILDREN
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Ruffalo v. Civiletti 185 is fasci-
nating because of its pragmatic perspective and its rejection of
the historical bar against the Eighth Circuit hearing custody
issues. Moreover, a citizen was provided with a federal forum
in which to obtain redress against the government and its
agents-a rare event in this circuit. The Ruffalo court carefully
and thoughtfully distinguishes its own decisions and others to
arrive at a creative solution to a perplexing problem faced by a
mother whose child was snatched from her by a bureaucracy.
And in the process, it redefines "liberty interest" in the con-
text of the family and its members.
Donna Ruffalo sought the return of her child, who had been
relocated by the federal government along with his father
under the federal Witness Protection Program. The dispute
over the child's return reached the Eighth Circuit after
Donna's efforts to obtain redress through the state courts
failed. ' 8
6
At the center of the controversy was a son born in 1969 to
Donna and Michael Ruffalo, Sr. When the child was three,
Donna obtained a default divorce and was awarded legal and
physical custody. Michael was given reasonable visitation
rights and ordered to pay child support. Subsequently, the
couple entered into an "Informal Letter Agreement Re Posses-
sion of Child," which provided that Donna would have "cus-
tody" of the minor child, while Michael would have
"possession"'18 7 with possession meaning physical custody.
185. 702 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1983).
186. Id. at 712-13.
187. Id. at 712 n.3. The agreement provided:
1. DONNA RUFFALO shall keep and maintain custody of the child
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Michael was a secret informer for the FBI, which was investi-
gating organized crime in Kansas City, Missouri. In 1978 fed-
eral officials received information that Michael's life was in
danger and Michael asked for protection. In 1978, both
Michael and his nine year-old son were taken into the federal
Witness Protection Program. 88 Donna was neither given no-
tice nor an opportunity to be heard in opposition to the re-
moval of her son and learned of his relocation only after the
fact. For the next four years, she was not allowed to see or talk
with her son.
The government created new identities for Michael and his
son and federal officials moved them to a secret location. They
were provided with new names, social security numbers, and a
temporary residence. In addition, the child received new
school records so he could be admitted to a new school with-
out having to produce records from his former school and re-
vealing his true identity.
At the time that Michael and his son went into the Witness
Protection Program, federal authorities knew that the child was
living with his father and thought he had legal custody.
Shortly thereafter, however, they learned that legal custody
had been awarded to Donna. Donna contacted federal offi-
cials, seeking information about her former husband and child.
She was told they were under the Witness Protection Program
and that their new identities and location would not be re-
vealed as disclosure would endanger Michael. The Program
offered, however, to relay messages to Michael, and the federal
Marshals' Service, which runs the Witness Protection Program,
told Michael on at least two occasions that Donna wanted to
2. It is further agreed that MICHAELJ. RUFFALO shall keep and maintain
possession of said minor child MICHAEL RUFFALO, and that no change of
said possession of this child shall be made without mutual agreement of the
parties or by further order of the Court in this respect.
3. The father MICHAELJ. RUFFALO shall continue to furnish the support
for the child by provising (sic) the same in kind for the child.
4. The mother DONNA RUFFALO shall be entitled to the possession of the
child without further order of the Court, on Sunday or Saturday of each
week; and they will alternate possession on important holidays.., and other
wise (sic) reasonable visitation right (sic) to Donna.
Id.
188. The federal Witness Protection Program was authorized by Title V of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, §§ 501-504 (preceding
18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1976)). It is administered by the United States Marshals Service.
Id. at 712 n.4.
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speak with her son on the phone. Michael did not allow her to
speak with her son.
Donna sought and obtained a custody hearing in Missouri
state court, which eventually ruled that she should have cus-
tody of her son.'8 9 When the custody order was served on
Michael, it was ignored by him and the U.S. government. After
her efforts in the state court proved unproductive, Donna be-
gan an action for injunctive relief and damages in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. The
defendants were her former husband and the federal officials
responsible for concealing the child through the Witness Pro-
tection Program. She alleged that the defendants violated the
due process clause of the fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution by unreasonably intruding on her right to family
integrity and to a relationship with her son. Her stated reasons
were the government's failure to provide her with a hearing
before infringing on her constitutionally protected liberty in-
terests, and interference with and destruction of her right to
enforce the state court custody orders.' 9 0
Proceedings were stayed in district court to allow Donna to
seek another custody hearing in state court.19 When the state
court ordered the child returned, and he was not, the federal
district court once again took up Donna's motion for partial
summary judgment, as well as the defendants' alternative mo-
tions for dismissal or for summary judgment. 9 2 After the dis-
trict court refused to grant Donna partial summary judgment
on her complaint, she appealed. The Eighth Circuit took the
matter under advisement and eventually decided to remand.
In its remand order the court of appeals held that Donna's
relationship with her son was part of the "liberty" protected by
189. Id. at 713. The Eighth Circuit noted, "on July 24, 1979, after Michael had
received notice of custody hearings through the Marshals Service and failed to ap-
pear, the state court modified its March 19, 1975, order, awarded 'the full care, con-
trol and custody of her son' to Donna, and cancelled all Michael's visitation rights or
privileges." Id.
190. Id. A similar constitutional claim was made on behalf of the minor child.
The complaint also alleged that the defendants had violated the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976); had committed various intentional torts, thereby
subjecting the United States to liability under the Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2671-2680 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); had violated the Freedom of Information and
Privacy Acts, 5 U.S.C. § 552, § 552a (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The complaint also
alleged that state law had been similarly violated. Id. at 713-14 n.5.
191. Ruffalo v. Civiletti, 522 F. Supp. 778 (W.D. Mo. 1981).
192. Ruffalo v. Civiletti, 539 F. Supp. 949 (W.D. Mo. 1982).
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the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 193 The Eighth
Circuit rejected a closely related decision from the Second Cir-
cuit, Leonhard v. Mitchell.194 In Leonhard the state court had
awarded custody of the children of a divorced couple to the
mother and visitation rights to the father. When the mother
remarried, and her new husband decided to testify for the gov-
ernment in an organized crime case, the entire family was relo-
cated and given new identities. The father obtained a state
court order awarding him custody, and sued in federal court
seeking a writ of mandamus demanding that the government
divulge the whereabouts and new identities of his children.
The Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment against the fa-
ther declaring that there was not a "clear constitutional right
to custody or visitation rights."'' 95 This rationale was rejected
by the Eighth Circuit:
If Leonhard may be read to mean that a parent who has been
awarded custody of his or her child has no constitutionally
protected interest, we must respectfully disagree. Parents
have a fundamental "liberty interest" in the care, custody,
and management of their children. We need not decide
whether a parent's visitation rights are constitutionally pro-
tected, because Donna has more than a right to
visitation....
That plaintiff has been deprived of a constitutionally pro-
tected right, of course, does not answer the whole question
of whether she has a claim for relief. She must also show
that she was deprived of this right without due process of
law. Ordinarily we would go on at this point to consider
what process is due. But here plaintiff got no process at all.
At no time was she allowed to challenge, before some im-
partial authority, the government's conclusion that it was
necessary to take Mike into the WPP, and to keep him there,
in order to protect Michael's life.' 96
The court of appeals then held that there was sufficient gov-
ernment action to trigger the due process provision of the fifth
amendment. It rejected the district court's conclusion that
Michael was not transformed "into a government actor by vir-
tue of his acting as a witness for the government and entering
193. Ruffalo v. Civiletti, 702 F.2d 710, 718-19 (8th Cir. 1983).
194. Leonhard v. Mitchell, 473 F.2d 709 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 949 (1973).
195. Id. at 713.
196. Ruffalo, 702 F.2d at 714-15.
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the Witness Protection Program."'' 9 7 It reasoned that the gov-
ernment was involved in a sequence of events including taking
the child to a new location, giving him a new identity, new so-
cial security number, new school records, and paying Michael's
lawyer to contest the state court's orders and to defend against
the custody claim, which culminated in the abrogation of
Donna's right to custody of the child. Furthermore, the court
was unconvinced that the government's role in these events
was insignificant. The court observed, "[the government] con-
tinues to conceal the whereabouts of both Michael and Mike.
To assert, as the government does, that it was Michael's sole
decision to take and retain Mike in defiance of the state court
order is wholly unrealistic." 9 8
The Eighth Circuit recognized that its decision appeared
contrary to that reached by the First Circuit Court of Appeals
in Melo-Tone Vending, Inc. v. United States 199 but concluded that
its holding did not conflict with the Melo-Tone rationale. 200 It
also distinguished an earlier Eighth Circuit decision, Bergmann
v. United States, where it had reversed a $69,077.91 award in a
wrongful death action under the Federal Torts Claim Act.20'
197. Id. at 716. The court cites Bennett v. Pasic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1263-64 (10th
Cir. 1976) to support the proposition that witnesses do not act under color of state
law.
198. Ruffalo, 702 F.2d at 716.
199. Id. at 716 n.12 (citing Melo-Tone Vending, Inc. v. United States, 666 F.2d
687 (1st Cir. 1981)).
200. Id. In Melo-Tone a creditor argued that he had been deprived of property
without due process because his debtor entered the Witness Protection Program and
the government refused to reveal the debtor's whereabouts. The First Circuit held
that there had been no "taking" of property for which compensation was due be-
cause the interference with the creditor's right to collect and enforce payment of his
note was merely an indirect consequence of the exercise of lawful governmental
power. The Eighth Circuit stated that even if the Melo-Tone analysis could apply to a
claim of deprivation of a liberty interest, it was clear that the interference with the
mother's right to custody was a direct consequence of the government taking her
child and refusing to reveal his location and identity. Id.
201. Id. (citing Bergmann v. United States, 689 F.2d 789 (8th Cir. 1982)). Berg-
mann held that the discretionary function exception of the Federal Torts Claim Act
applied and that the government was not negligent in supervising a protected wit-
ness. The government owed no duty to protect the public from the witness. Berg-
mann was distinguishable for two reasons. First, Donna Ruffalo was more than a
member of the public: she was the mother of a child taken into the Witness Protec-
tion Program by government employees. Second, the protected witness in Bergmann
killed a policeman without assistance of federal officials. Here, it was unlikely that
the boys' father could have taken the child without government assistance. Ruffalo,
702 F.2d at 716 n.12.
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Ruffalo is remarkable because the court ignored its long-
standing view of federal jurisdiction regarding the use of its
injunctive powers, i.e., that ordinarily, a federal court will not
grant an injunction to compel a parent to obey a state decree
awarding custody of the child to the other parent. 20 2 The deci-
sion stands in sharp contrast to the court's recent expression
of its views of what constitutes a constitutional "liberty inter-
est" when parents seek redress against state governments by
means of section 1983 actions. It reflects both a deep sense of
compassion for the plight of a citizen who is struggling against
awesome government power and pragmatically recognizes that
any other view would leave the citizen with no effective means
to redress her grievance.
VI. OTHER DECISIONS
From our survey of the Eighth Circuit, we have found that it
has been involved in a variety of other domestic disputes. In
this section we have briefly summarized several of the more
interesting decisions.
A. Attorney Fees
In Derheim v. Hennepin Welfare Bd. Dep't of Community Serv. ,203 a
couple had incurred substantial attorney fees in bringing an
action against the Minnesota Department of Public Welfare.
The agency had taken away their foster parent license but later
reissued it upon discovery that the charges could not be sub-
stantiated. The Durheims asserted that a federal constitutional
question had been successfully pursued before the administra-
tive agency, and therefore, they were entitled to prevail on
their fee request. 20 4 The court of appeals rejected their action
to recover attorney fees under the Civil Rights Attorneys Fees
Award Act of 1976.205 It observed:
202. See Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1042-44 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (jurisdiction
to grant injunctive relief on custody matters should be left to the states); cf. Lloyd v.
Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 493-94 (7th Cir. 1982) (disapproving an escalating damage
award against the absconding parent as the equivalent of an injunction).
203. Derheim v. Hennepin Welfare Bd., Dep't of Community Serv., 688 F.2d 66,
68 (8th Cir. 1982). The trial court's opinion appears at 542 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Minn.
1981).
204. Derheim, 688 F.2d at 68 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
205. Id. at 69. The plaintiffs relied on New York Gaslight Club v. Carey, 447 U.S.
54 (1979), and Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980), to support their assertion.
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The administrative record, however, belies this assertion.
First, the Derheims' memorandum of law submitted to the
hearing officer focuses only on issues of North Dakota and
Minnesota juvenile law. It refers to no federal constitu-
tional issue and cites no federal cases. Second, Hearing Of-
ficer Lunde's findings of fact and conclusions make no
mention of any federal constitutional issue. Third, the
hearing officer's report-a document distinct from the find-
ings and conclusions-refers to no constitutional issue.20 6
B. Attorney Malpractice
A dispute involving attorney malpractice in handling a disso-
lution matter was resolved in favor of the client in Kuehn v.
Garcia.20 7 The plaintiff retained the defendant, Garcia, to rep-
resent her in a divorce case. He began his representation by
interposing a counterclaim to her husband's action. During
the pendency of the matter, the plaintiff moved to Wisconsin.
When the North Dakota matter was set for trial, Garcia claimed
he notified the plaintiff by letter of the date but she denied
receiving notice. Judgment was entered by default.
The client filed a claim with the Grievance Committee of the
North Dakota Supreme Court, which reviewed it along with
several other complaints against the lawyer. The committee
found that the facts warranted a conclusion that the defendant
had violated Canon 7 of the North Dakota Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility for lawyers, 20 8 which requires that a law-
yer represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law.
Garcia was suspended by the North Dakota Supreme Court.20 9
After suspension, the client brought an action for legal mal-
practice in federal court alleging that Garcia negligently per-
mitted judgment to be entered by failing to appear at trial or
notify the plaintiff of trial. Consequently, she was denied cus-
tody of her children, her share -of marital property valued in
excess of $40,000, insurance and expenses of $800.00.
The district court ordered partial summary judgment on the
206. Derheim, 688 F.2d at 69.
207. 608 F.2d 1143, 1148 petition for reh'g denied, (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 943 (1980).
208. Id. at 1145. Canon 7 requires that a lawyer represent a client zealously within
the bounds of the law. The Kuehn court noted: "The North Dakota Supreme Court
has adopted the American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility." Id.
at n.2.
209. Id. at 1145 (citing In re Garcia, 243 N.W.2d 383, 385 (N.D. 1976)).
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liability issue against Garcia. The Eighth Circuit affirmed hold-
ing that thejudgment of the North Dakota Supreme Court in a
prior disciplinary proceeding against Garcia rendered the issue
of Garcia's tort liability res judicata, and that Garcia was there-
fore collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue in the sub-
sequent malpractice action.2 10
C. Judicial Immunity
In Patten v. Glaser,21I an ex-husband brought a civil rights ac-
tion against a state trial judge who had presided over the hus-
band's divorce case and who found the husband in contempt
for violating several orders as to visitation, custody and sup-
port payments. The federal district court dismissed the hus-
band's claims and he appealed. The Eighth Circuit held that
the state trial judge had jurisdiction to decide the divorce ac-
tion and that the judge's act of finding the husband in con-
tempt was a judicial act and, therefore, the judge was immune
from liability under section 1983.212
D. Intervention
In S.E.C. v. Flight Transp. Corp.,213 Joyce Rubin, whose hus-
band was fighting a Securities and Exchange Commission ac-
tion, filed an action for divorce in Minnesota state court. She
then moved to intervene in the SEC action in federal district
court to protect her interests in various property owned by the
couple. The federal district court denied her motion to inter-
vene, noting that the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure had not been met because she
was unable to show that the disposition of the action by the
S.E.C. would, as a practical matter, impair or impede her abil-
ity to protect her interest in her husband's company. The mo-
tion was also denied on the ground there was no intervention
as a matter of right in Securities and Exchange Commission
actions. 2 14 The district court also noted that intervention
210. Kuehn, 608 F.2d at 1146.
211. 771 F.2d 1178 (8th Cir. 1985).
212. Id. at 1179 (citing Birch v. Mazander, 678 F.2d 754, 755 (8th Cir. 1982),
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 360-61 (1972) and McAlester v. Brown, 469 F.2d
1280, 1282 (5th Cir. 1972)).
213. S.E.C. v. Flight Transp. Corp., 699 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1983).
214. Flight Transp. Corp., 699 F.2d at 947. The federal district court had relied on
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Everest Management Corp., 475 F.2d 1236 (2d Cir. 1972)
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would unnecessarily complicate the issues. 21 5
The Eighth Circuit reversed, and ordered that Ms. Rubin be
allowed to intervene:
The appellees argue that Joyce Rubin's interest in Wil-
liam Rubin's property is inchoate and, therefore, insuffi-
cient to support intervention. We disagree. Under Minn.
Stat. Ann. § 518.54, Subd. 5, 1982 Minn. Sess. Law Serv.
368, 369 (West),
Each spouse shall be deemed to have a common
ownership in marital property that vests not later than
the time of the entry of the decree in a proceeding for
dissolution or annulment. The extent of the vested in-
terest shall be determined and made final by the court
.pursuant to section 518.58.
By enacting this provision, the Minnesota legislature in-
tended to confirm
that the division or disposition of marital property...
incident to a [divorce] . . . is a division of a common
ownership by spouses in property for the purposes of
the property laws of this state and for the purposes of
United States and Minnesota income tax laws.
Chapter 464, § 3, 1982 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 370 (West).
Marital property is, essentially, property acquired by either
party during the marriage. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.54,
Subd. 5, 1982 Minn.Sess.Law Serv. 368 (West). Neither
William Rubin nor the SEC suggests that Rubin's assets are
not marital property. Thus, Joyce Rubin is virtually certain
to become entitled to some of those assets upon division of
the property, because of the conclusive presumption "that
each spouse made a substantial contribution to the acquisi-
tion of income and property while they were living together
as husband and wife." Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.58, 1982
Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 370 (West). It is irrelevant that the
precise moment of "vesting" is undetermined.
Finally, the existing parties cannot be expected to repre-
sent Joyce Rubin's interests adequately .... Joyce Rubin has
filed for divorce. Bitter feelings may be expected to result.
Under these circumstances, we believe that basic fairness
demands that Joyce Rubin be allowed to intervene in order
and Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Canadian Javelin Ltd., 58 F.R.D. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
These cases discussed intervention as a matter of right in S.E.C. actions.
215. Flight Tramp. Corp., 699 F.2d at 947. On this point, the trial judge cited Park-
lane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
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to protect her own interests in the marital property. Even
though she and William have, on paper, the same financial
interest, she should not have to depend on representation
by a person with whom her personal relationship has appar-
ently been irretrievably broken.
2 16
E. Adoption
A section 1983 claim brought by a white couple arising from
Missouri's refusal to return a black child in their foster case,
was upheld in J.H.H. v. O'Hara.217 The couple argued that
Missouri's policy of placing children with foster parents of the
same "racial, cultural, ethnic, and religious background" de-
nied them equal protection of the law. The Eighth Circuit dis-
tinguished Palmore v. Sidoti,218 where the Supreme Court held
that a mother could not be divested of custody of a child solely
because she married a man of a different race and declined to
view Palmore as establishing a "broad proscription against the
consideration of race in matters of child custody and foster
care placement." 2 9 It reasoned that at most, Palmore estab-
lished that race may not be the sole factor in determining the
best interests of a child. 220
F. Standing
In DeMent v. Oglala Sioux Tribal Court, the Eighth Circuit ruled
that a non-Indian father had standing to seek habeas corpus
relief in federal court to secure custody of. his children who
lived with their mother on a reservation in North Dakota. 22'
The court of appeals held that while the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act 22 2 and the Indian Child Welfare Act22 3 did not
entitle him to relief, he had stated a valid claim under the In--
216. Flight Transp. Corp., at 948-49 (citations omitted).
217. J.H.H. v. O'Hara, 878 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1117
(1990).
218. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
219. O'Hara, 878 F.2d at 245.
220. Id.
221. 874 F.2d 510, 515 (8th Cir. 1989).
222. Id. at 513. The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A (1982) does not furnish an implied cause of action in federal court. See
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988).
223. Id. at 514. The custody of children in a divorce proceeding is not covered
under the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1903 (1982).
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dian Civil Rights Act.2 24 It rejected the argument by the tribal
court that it had exclusive subject matter jurisdiction to decide
the issue under the Indian Child Welfare Act.22 5
G. Areas Not Covered
We have not covered many other decisions of the Court of
Appealsfor the Eight Circuit which may directly affect the fam-
ilies within its jurisdiction. The abortion cases, for example,
require an analysis quite apart from the survey we have pro-
vided in this article. Furthermore, the decisions involving Na-
tive American housing, custody, and adoption are left for
another writing.
CONCLUsION
This article demonstrates the significant influence the Eighth
Circuit has on domestic matters. Moreover, a number of the
Eighth Circuit's decisions must be analyzed from the perspec-
tive of their impact on domestic matters. In addition, the
Eighth Circuit should reexamine its decision in Bush v. Tay-
lor,22 6 probe more deeply into the family structure in the wire-
tap cases, and rethink its tight-fisted handling of section 1983
actions.
224. Id. at 514. The Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1982) conferred
the father with a federal cause of action.
225. Id. at 514.
226. 893 F.2d 962 (8th.Cir. 1990).
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